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In the last 20 years, legal reforms and the establishment of rule of
law have once again taken center stage as part of the new law and devel-
opment movement.' Yet the results are, according to critics, much the
same as in the past: poor.2 Is the well-intentioned epistemic community
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. E-mail: peerenboom@law.ucla.edu. Vari-
ous versions of this Article were presented at the University of Melbourne, Griffith University,
Oxford, and the Georgetown and University of Washington law schools. I thank the partici-
pants in the seminars and workshops for their comments.
1. See generally, David M. Trubek, Law and Development: Then and Now, 90 Am.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 223 (1996); Julio Faundez, Legal Technical Assistance, in GOOD
GOVERNMENT AND LAW: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE THIRD WORLD 1 (Julio
Faundez ed., 1997); Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political
Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Response, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 336, 344-48 (Erik G. Jensen &
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (distinguishing between five waves of legal reforms).
2. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of
Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Carnegie Paper No. 34,
2003) (discussing problems in conception, operation, and evaluation of efforts to export the
rule of law and claiming that many of the lessons from prior experiences with law and devel-
opment are superficial and often not acted on); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New
Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2280 (2003)
("Despite billions of aid dollars, programs to promote the rule of law have been disappoint-
ing."); Tim Lindsey, Preface to LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES
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of comparative law scholars, international NGOs, and multilateral and
bilateral development agencies doomed to repeat the same mistakes for-
ever? Has there been any advancement in our understanding of the
relationship between law and development?
This Article applies existing conceptual tools for describing, predict-
ing, and assessing legal reforms to the efforts to establish rule of law in
China, in the process shedding light on the various pathways and meth-
odologies of reform so as to facilitate assessment of competing reform
strategies. While drawing on China for concrete examples, the discussion
involves issues that are generally applicable to comparative law and the
new law and development movement, and thus it addresses the broader
issue of what we know and do not know about legal reforms.
In the descriptive dimension, scholars often portray legal reforms in
China and other developing states horizontally in terms of "transplants,"
or various other metaphors that emphasize the foreign or domestic
source of reforms, and vertically in terms of a top-down versus bottom-
up or inductive versus deductive process.
The second dimension is predictive: what determines whether a for-
eign or homegrown model will be adopted, or explains how, why, and
the extent to which a foreign model will be adapted to local circum-
stances? Similarly, what explains the choice of a top-down or deductive
approach as opposed to a bottom-up or inductive approach?
The third dimension is normative: how do we assess reforms? What
counts as a successful reform? Is "mere" compliance with rules neces-
sary or sufficient? Should we assess reforms in terms of other standards
such as effectiveness, efficiency, justice, or human rights?
After a brief discussion of these three categories, I then apply them to
a range of legal reforms. The most general of these reforms is the move
away from a Mao-era style of governance to a socialist rule of law. I then
turn to more specific developments in criminal law and judicial independ-
ence that distinguish different conceptions of rule of law-while showing
that China's legal system faces the familiar challenge of meeting the often
conflicting requirements of efficiency and justice, procedural and substan-
tive justice, and judicial independence and accountability. On the criminal
side, I examine the move away from an inquisitorial system to a more ad-
versarial system, the introduction of summary and simplified procedures
similar to plea bargaining in other states, and the evolution of administra-
tive detention. With respect to judicial independence, I focus on the
(Tim Lindsey ed., forthcoming 2006) (claiming a consensus that many if not most legal re-
form projects in developing states have failed); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 3-4 (2002) (noting many reform projects have failed to
deliver the anticipated results).
[Vol. 27:823
What Have We Learned
unique role of the adjudicative committee and China's novel system of
individual case supervision.
Part III then concludes with remarks concerning what these case
studies reveal about our current conceptual tools for describing, predict-
ing, and evaluating legal reforms; offers suggestions on how this line of
research may be extended; and argues in favor of a pragmatic approach
to reforms.
I. DESCRIPTION, PREDICTION, AND EVALUATION
A. Describing Reforms: Horizontal Metaphors
The dominant trope in law and development has been the "legal
transplant."3 Dissatisfied with some of the connotations of transplants,
commentators have offered a host of alternative metaphors and catchy
4 6phrases, including legal irritant, legal translation,5 legal transformation,
legal transposition,' convergence/divergence/differentiation, selective
adaptation,9 and institutional monocropping.' ° Not to be outdone, Chi-
nese scholars have their own rich metaphorical lexicon: bentu ziyuan
(native resources)" and the ever-popular X (e.g., rule of law, human
rights, criminal law, judicial independence, discovery rules) with Chi-
nese characteristics, which echoes the turn of the century motto of
Chinese substance/essence, Western means (zhongti, xiyong)-itself an
3. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1993). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences recently devoted a special issue to yet
another round on legal transplants. See Special Issue: Legal Transplantation in Contemporary
China, Soc. Sci. IN CHINA, Fall 2004, at 108.
4. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998).
5. Md.ximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1 (2004).
6. Xu Zhangrun, Western Law in China: Transplantation or Transformation-Four
Cases and Liang Shuming's Responses, Soc. SCI. IN CHINA, Fall 2004, at 134.
7. Esin Orticii, Law as Transposition, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 205 (2002).
8. KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (1999).
9. Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adap-
tation, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2004).
10. Peter Evans, Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping
and the Potentials of Deliberation, STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV., Winter 2004, at 30, 31 (describ-
ing institutional monocropping as the imposition on developing states of idealized versions of
Anglo-American institutions, which are presumed to transcend national circumstances, level
of development, position in the global economy, and culture, and claiming that the processes
have produced "profoundly disappointing results").
11. Su Li, Bianfa, Fazhi Jianshe ji qi Bentu Ziyuan [Change of Law, Establishment of
the Rule of Law and its Native Resources], 5 ZHONGWAi FAXUE 1 (1995).
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echo of the Confucian notion of harmony but not identity (he er bu
tong).1
2
Each phrase has advantages and disadvantages. In general, they dif-
fer primarily with respect to the degree of change in the target state's
legal system, the amount of target state agency, and the open-endedness
of reform as compared to an evolutionary procession toward a predeter-
mined end.
Taken as a botanical metaphor, legal transplant suggests a teleologi-
cal development toward a fixed endpoint-legal systems will mature into
liberal democratic rule of law just as Aristotle's tiny acorn will one day
become a sturdy oak tree. Of course, some transplants may not survive,
given the different soil and weather conditions. Similarly, some legal
systems may fail to grow into a full-fledged liberal democratic rule of
law. The risk of incompatibility is even clearer when legal transplant is
understood as a medical rather than botanical metaphor. Just as some
recipients of organ transplants may reject incompatible tissue, so too
some systems may reject liberal democratic rule of law or more particu-
lar institutional reforms or practices.
The medical interpretation suggests the transplant will lead to dis-
crete changes-replacement of one organ-without any overall systemic
change; the recipient is still the same person. The botanical reading sug-
gests the possibility of fundamental system alteration, although more
discrete changes are also possible: a change in the rules for mortgages
based on common law practices, for instance, need not lead to the re-
placement of a civil law tradition with common law, much less to a
fundamental change in the conception of rule of law. In contrast, legal
irritant captures the way a new rule or practice may disrupt the existing
legal culture and current legal practices, sometimes in unexpected and
far-reaching ways.
The legal translation metaphor highlights the diversity in how do-
nors and recipients may understand and interpret a rule. Broad principles
such as "presumption of innocence" or "due process" have been con-
strued very differently in different legal systems-and over time within
the same legal system. Even more specific statements or terms are often
indeterminate in important ways and thus may give rise to different in-
terpretations and applications, as critical legal scholars and postmodern
devotees have labored to explain. Simply copying legal codes, without
any understanding of how subsequent interpretations may have twisted
12. ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 244 (Cai Xiqin & Lai Bo trans., 1994). "Harmony but
not identity" is often associated with cultural assimilation and the relationship between Chi-
nese and non-Chinese. It is equally applicable, however, to legal reforms that involve some
element of assimilation of foreign models.
[Vol. 27:823
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"the plain meaning" beyond all recognition for laypeople, suggests that
much will be left out in translation unless the translator is deeply famil-
iar with the actual practice in the source state. Conversely, on the
recipient side, deeply ingrained beliefs may lead to misunderstandings or
creative misinterpretation, much as the transmission of Buddhism to
China imparted a Daoist flavor to key Buddhist concepts."
Whereas the processes of legal transplantation and translation are pri-
marily unidirectional, the triad of convergence/divergence/differentiation
opens up the possibility that all legal systems may be changing and that
change may occur in multiple directions. For instance, globalization has
caused changes to legal systems in traditional exporter states in Euro-
America as well as in the developing states that are normally importers.
Moreover, the process can be interactive, as in the "race to the bottom,"
which occurs as states change their tax codes, labor rules, and social se-
curity policies to attract and retain foreign investment.
Legal transformation, legal transposition, and selective adaptation
also highlight that institutions, rules, and practices may change in the
process of adoption. Selective adaptation, however, places more empha-
sis on target-state agency. Rather than merely being passive recipients,
legal actors in the target state actively choose elements and reject others,
interpret terms consistent with local perceptions and understandings, and
modify or rework institutions, rules, or practices in light of domestic cir-
cumstances.
X with Chinese characteristics also suggests agency adaptation,
while Chinese as substance, Western as means suggests the degree of
localization will be significant, with primarily domestic concerns driving
legal reforms.'4 The latter also suggests (incorrectly in my view) that
China's leaders view legal reforms as an instrumental fix for some tech-
nical problems but do not recognize that the transition to rule of law will
fundamentally change the nature of the political order.1
13. The metaphor of legal translations leads into the murky waters of postmodernism
on the one hand and the analytic philosophy of language, including discussions of incom-
mensurability and holistic systems of meaning, on the other.
14. Turn of the century legal and political reforms were often described in terms of an
"impact-response" model, which is similar to legal transplants in emphasizing the Western
origins of legal reforms and in being unidirectional. Just as the notion that contemporary legal
reforms are simply imported from abroad fails to capture the complexity of the dynamics of
reform today, so too the notion that China's turn of the century reforms were driven by the
sudden realization that China lagged behind Western states in technical, military, and legal-
political matters was too simple. For a critique of the impact-response model, see Paul A.
Cohen, Ch'ing China: Confrontation with the West, 1850-1900, in MODERN EAST ASIA: Es-
SAYS IN INTERPRETATION 29 (James B. Crowley ed., 1970).
15. One view is that Western reformers have duped Chinese leaders into accepting a
Trojan horse by characterizing potentially disruptive political-legal reforms as merely techni-
cal changes. A more common and well-supported view is that leaders are aware of the
Spring 20061
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While useful in some respects, all of these metaphors share three
common shortcomings. First, as illustrated below, they tend to oversim-
plify the reform process.
Second, all allow for some degree of change in the process of trans-
mission but do not specify or quantify the amount of change beyond
which the original becomes something new and different. Take, for in-
stance, the triad of convergence/divergence/differentiation. These
distinctions are always a matter of degree, particularly in a state as large
as China. Depending on one's focus, it is possible to describe the overall
trajectory of change in China's legal system and changes in particular
institutions, rules, or practices in terms of all three categories. There has
been some movement in the direction of rule of law, even a liberal de-
mocratic rule of law (and "constitutionalism"), 6 and yet at the same time
one could find evidence of divergence and differentiation. Similarly,
there seems no way in principle to distinguish between, for example, a
transplant that has been selectively adapted and a new hybrid or between
a new interpretation of a translated rule and a new and different rule. At
some point of specificity, every system is unique: X with Chinese char-
acteristics is banal unless one specifies the meaningful differences
between X and its counterparts in other states. 7 Whether the differences
are meaningful will depend on one's purpose in comparing the systems.
As there are many reasons to compare legal systems, there will be no
single standard.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, these metaphors, while useful
in describing legal reforms, do not help predict or explain which foreign
models are likely to be adopted and why; which transplanted institutions,
rules, or practices will take hold and which will fail; or which native re-
sources or Chinese characteristics will become part of the legal system in
China. The predictive project requires further specification and testing of
a range of variables, as will be discussed shortly. First, however, a few
words on vertical metaphors.
potential of rule of law reforms to lead to fundamental political change. They fully appreciate
the danger that institutional-strengthening reforms may create a momentum that exceeds the
state's capacity to control. State leaders, however, have decided to embark on reforms for a
variety of reasons, including realization of the ruling party's own goals. RANDALL PEEREN-
BOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002) [hereinafter CHINA's LONG
MARCH].
16. See Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of
Constitutional Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1
(2002).
17. This same criticism applies generally to the notion of mixed legal systems. On the
growing use of "mixed systems" as a descriptive category in comparative law, see Kenneth
G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5 (2003).
[Vol. 27:823
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B. Describing Reforms: Vertical Metaphors
While the previous metaphors emphasized a horizontal relationship
between a source state and recipient, metaphors such as top-down versus
bottom-up or deductive versus inductive invoke a vertical dimension.
Many commentators have argued that legal reforms in China have been
top-down-orchestrated by the central government and Party leaders-
with some commentators praising this approach and other criticizing it.
Clearly, central authorities have played a key role in setting the direction
for reform and approving major policy changes such as the shift to a
more law-based order. In practice, however, many if not most specific
reform initiatives originate at lower levels as judges, prosecutors, law-
yers, and officials working in the system attempt to solve problems they
encounter in carrying out their duties." Increasingly, civil society, the
media, and legal academics are also providing the impetus for change by
monitoring and criticizing the legal system.
Whereas a deductive approach to regulation attempts to derive ap-
propriate rules, practices, or institutions from a pre-given set of general
principles or models, an inductive approach identifies a problem, exam-
ines the various solutions to the problem to identify patterns and general
principles, and then tests the principles by applying them in different
contexts and observing the results or consequences. '9 Thus, in one ver-
sion of the inductive model, the first step is to identify the problem. The
next task is benchmarking, which entails surveying promising ways of
solving the problem that are superior to those currently used yet within
the existing (local) system's capacity to emulate and eventually surpass.
After that comes simultaneous engineering, where interested parties pro-
pose changes to the provisional design or solution based on their own
experiences and needs. The final component is error correction and
learning by monitoring: participants and independent actors monitor
progress by pooling information from their own experiments with infor-
mation from other localities about the results of their approaches to
similar problems.20
In general, deduction is associated with foreign models transplanted
to China and implemented in a top-down fashion. In this approach, for-
eign governments, foreign legal experts, and international development
18. See generally CHINA's LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 153-56.
19. Michael W. Dowdle, Visibilizing the Invisible Hand, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY:
LAW, CULTURE AND EXPERIENCE (Michael W. Dowdle ed., forthcoming 2006).
20. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). Developing their regulatory theory in the context of a
liberal democracy, Dorf and Sabel refer to their approach as a directly deliberative polyarchy
based on democratic experimentalism. For a discussion of the applicability and limits of this
approach for China, see CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 424-31.
Spring 2006)
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agencies are likely to play a significant role in the reform process, as
they are most familiar with the foreign model. One example of this
method would be the attempts of international actors to promote a highly
particularistic liberal democratic conception of rule of law in China
based on the legal systems of northern Europe and the United States. A
more specific example would be the calls by United Nations organs and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to eliminate all
forms of administrative detention-based on assumptions about criminal
law and the protection of individual rights derived from the experiences
of other states, which are then applied to China without further consid-
eration of the actual costs and benefits of eliminating detention."
In contrast, induction shares greater affinities with a bottom-up ap-
proach that gives a more prominent role to local actors in recognizing
problems and devising solutions. As discussed below, China has devel-
oped a number of institutions and practices to overcome the problem of
judicial corruption and the inadequate competence of some judges, in-
cluding reliance on an adjudicative committee of senior judges to review
cases and individual case supervision by the procuracy, people's con-
gress, and the judiciary itself.
It is possible to mix and match some of these elements and thus pro-
duce different strategies for reform (and most likely considerable
confusion in terminology in the absence of concrete examples). Domes-
tic concerns might, largely if not exclusively, dictate the reform agenda
of some states, and it might be top-down or bottom-up, deductive or in-
ductive (or both). Similarly, foreign actors might advocate an inductive
approach by emphasizing local knowledge and local participation in
agenda setting and implementation.
C. Prediction
While descriptive metaphors continue to proliferate, there has been
less progress in identifying the factors that lead to successful transplants
or to convergence rather than divergence, or in testing the factors that
might favor deductive approaches rather than inductive approaches (or
vice versa).22 Nevertheless, empirical studies in other areas have made
21. See Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but
Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate Administrative Detention in China, 98 Nw. U. L.
REV. 991 (2004) [hereinafter Out of the Pan].
22. For an early attempt to predict success or failure of transplants, see Otto Kahn-
Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (emphasizing
political factors including interest group politics over social, economic, and cultural factors).
See also Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule of Law
Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 99 (2004) (grouping obstacles to
rule of law into three general categories-resource and institutional capacity shortcomings;
[Vol. 27:823
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some progress in sorting out key components behind social, legal, and
political change. 23 These studies as well as past experience suggest sev-
eral important elements.24
One factor in the adoption of a model is the prestige, power, and
normative appeal of the exporter or promoter. The United States, the
European Union, and individual European states often advocate their
own models for capital markets, corporate governance, criminal law, and
so on. Although the European Union has dedicated more funds to rule of
law programs in China than the U.S. government, U.S.-based models
have an advantage in that many Chinese legal scholars study in the
United States and hence are most familiar with the U.S. system. More-
over, the literature on the United States is easily accessible and in
English. The United States also exercises influence indirectly through
international development agencies such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, through international legal regimes such as
the World Trade Organization and the UN human rights system, and
through NGOs.
Domestically, the prestige, power, and normative appeal of the local
promoters who back the import or a local alternative may also play a
role, especially when there is division among the ruling elite as to which
path to take. More generally, the lack of local ownership is one of the
main reasons for the failure of legal reform projects sponsored by the
international community.
Interest group politics-who will benefit and who will be harmed-
will also help explain the adoption or rejection of some reforms and why
some foreign models are adapted in particular ways in China. Opposition
may come from actors within the legal system, such as the bar
social-cultural-historical problems; and political-economy barriers-and arguing that political-
economy obstacles, including opposition by key interest groups, have been the biggest barriers
in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe).
23. There are vast literatures containing numerous empirical studies on transition to and
consolidation of democracy, the relationship between law and development, and factors affect-
ing the implementation of human rights. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS (Sabine C. Carey & Steven C. Poe eds., 2004). There is also a growing empirical
literature on the establishment and implementation of rule of law, with "rule of law" taken as
the dependent variable. In addition, several systematic empirical studies look at particular
features of the legal system in relation to economic development and the protection of rights.
See generally Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relation-
ship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809 (2005) (summarizing empirical studies of the relationship
between rule of law and economic growth, human rights, and democracy); see also Jensen,
supra note 1, at 336.
24. For a case study that examines different factors that might explain the similarities
and differences in the development of the judicial system in the socialist states of Vietnam and
Russia, see Penelope Nicholson, Comparative Law and Legal Transplants between Socialist
States: An Historical Perspective, in LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL
STATES (Tim Lindsey ed., forthcoming 2006).
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association or senior members of the judiciary, who benefit from the cur-
rent system, however inefficient or corrupt.
A related issue is the nature of the advantages for those who will
benefit from the reforms: does the reform make the system more trans-
parent and fair, reduce costs, increase the ability of the central
government to control local state actors, or enhance the legitimacy of the
government? The timing of the benefits may also be relevant: will the
reforms produce short-term results or will benefits accrue only in the
long run? Producing quick results may be particularly important in states
where there is deep suspicion about the value of law-as in less eco-
nomically developed states with strong traditional systems of norms--or
in authoritarian or post-authoritarian states where the public may fear
law as a tool of repression or the political elite.
The nature and relative robustness of civil society is another factor.
In some cases, reformers will be able to mobilize civil society to over-
come the lack of political will at the state level or elite opposition to
reforms. In other cases, civil society may be weak or divided over par-
ticular measures or the merits of legal reform in general. Bottom-up
approaches often rely on greater participation by citizens, NGOs, and
civil society. Part of the problem with exporting bottom-up approaches
based on deliberative democracy is they assume civil society in develop-
ing states will be equally robust and play the same role as in Western
liberal states. This will often not be the case.5 In China, many reform
measures come from those working within the system and thus continue
to privilege elite technocrats.
Economic factors (GDP per capita, growth rates, amounts of foreign
direct investment) affect the demand for rule of law and the ability of a
state to afford reforms and operate an efficient legal system staffed by
well-trained and well-paid professionals immune from corruption. Apart
from GDP levels, a state's distribution of wealth, its degree of marketiza-
tion, and whether wealth is generated from broad-based market activities
25. See Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Civil Society, Democracy and Rule of
Law: A New Conceptual Framework, in THE POLITICS OF AFFECTIVE RELATIONS: EAST ASIA
AND BEYOND 249 (Hahm Chaihark et al. eds., 2004). See also David K. Linnan, Like a Fish
Needs a Bicycle: Public Law Theory, Civil Society and Governance Reform in Indonesia, in
LAw REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed., forthcoming
2006) (observing that the international donor community has assumed a similar conception of
the state and civil society as in developed Western states-a largely secular, limited neutral
state and liberal society in opposition to the state-and suggesting that donors may be unwill-
ing to accept non-Western conceptions of the state and civil society, as in Indonesia where
Islam, communitarianism, and a post-colonial concern with nationalism play a more important
role).
[Vol. 27:823
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or is "easy" money derived from the sale of oil or other natural resources
may also be factors.26
The nature of the political regime is another factor, as is the level of
sophistication of political institutions. Some institutions and practices
that work well in a liberal democracy may not work so well or may not
be feasible in China; conversely, some institutions or practices that work
well in China would not be acceptable in a liberal democracy.
Even when there is no ideological barrier to transplantation, local in-
stitutions may lack the institutional capacity to implement reforms.
China has had to rebuild virtually from scratch key institutions such as
the courts, procuracy, law schools, and the legal profession, all of which
were weakened or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Neverthe-
less, legal reformers in China still enjoyed the benefit of a relatively
strong state and political stability. Reformers in failed states or transi-
tional states undergoing regime change as a result of war face even
greater challenges. As in Iraq, leaders of a new government will be pre-
occupied with simply restoring law and order and thus may be diverted
from focusing on economic, political, and legal reforms.
A related issue is institutional culture and the compatibility of re-
forms with institutional norms and practices. China's civil and criminal
law systems were based on an amalgam of civil, socialist, and traditional
law. Efforts to introduce elements of a common law system have chal-
lenged the theoretical underpinning and normative assumptions of the
existing system and required judges, prosecutors, and lawyers to adopt
different roles. Similarity in legal systems facilitates understanding be-
tween external and internal actors, reduces system friction, and decreases
the likelihood of unexpected consequences. At a minimum, reforms are
likely to be more effective when relevant actors are familiar with the
laws, practices, or institutions being adopted. Fortunately, in this era of
mixed legal systems, many key actors will be aware of the general fea-
tures of other systems."
26. See SAMANTHA F. RAVICH, MARKETIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST ASIAN Ex-
PERIENCES (2000) (arguing that marketization leads to the development of civil society and a
process of democratic learning on the part of citizens that is crucial for legal and political
reforms); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME
AND ABROAD 138 (2003) (attributing problems in the development of rule of law and estab-
lishment of democracy in the Middle East in part to a business class and citizenry dependent
on easy money from oil). Easy money tends to produce corporatist or clientelist relationships
between the elite and the government and allows the government to buy off the populace and
delay political reforms.
27. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Trans-
plant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (using data from 49 states, the authors argue that
states with developed legal orders and a population familiar with basic principles of the trans-
planted law were more successful at incorporating the transplanted law than those without and
that differences in legal families were less important.).
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Some factors will play a greater role in some areas of law than in
others. For instance, population size, ethnic diversity, and cultural fac-
tors (including religious beliefs) influence efforts to improve human
rights. As the case studies below illustrate, many other issue-specific
factors could be added to the list, including unforeseeable events like a
particularly egregious case of injustice that results in a public clamor for
change.
D. Appraisal and Evaluation: The Normative Dimension
In the end, how we describe reforms or whether this process is one
of induction or deduction-i.e., "how we get there"-may not matter as
much as the results. While in some cases the results may be clearly pref-
erable, in other cases they may be more difficult to assess. What counts
as a successful transplant or a successful instance of regulatory innova-
tion? Is it enough that people comply with the new regulations or
institutions? (People can, of course, comply with bad rules or bad sys-
tems: think of apartheid in South Africa.)
To be sure, compliance is not always a minimal accomplishment-
surely government leaders in China would appreciate greater compliance
with tax payment rules and less tax avoidance. On the other hand, low
compliance does not necessarily mean a law is not effective. There is
very little compliance with speed limits on U.S. highways, for example,
but the laws are still effective, in that most people do not exceed the
speed limit by more than 5/mph (depending on the strictness of en-
forcement). Conversely, a high level of compliance may not mean a law
is effective, as compliance might be the result of a low standard that did
not require a change in behavior.
The passing of a law may also serve a variety of functions, some of
which may have little to do with either compliance or effectiveness in
the sense of behavioral change. For instance, many states sign human
rights treaties with no intention of complying or changing behavior.
The costs of ratifying the treaties are low, and the states may be able to
avoid censure while sending a signal that they are becoming good mem-
bers of the international community. The annual vote in Geneva to
censure China for human rights violations (more accurately, civil and
political rights violations) and China's bid to hold the Olympics in 2008
28. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Co-
operation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387 (2000).
29. See generally Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J.
PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002) (ratification of treaties does not translate into better
protection for human rights and may even have a negative effect, at least in the short term).
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both influenced the timing of its signature of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Similarly, in 2004,
China passed a redundant regulation against soccer hooliganism, pre-
sumably to assure foreign critics, upset by the anti-Japanese behavior of
Chinese fans during the final of the Asia Cup in Beijing, that China
could manage the Olympics.
Legal reforms may also be assessed in terms of economic efficiency
and wealth maximization. Few if any reforms will ever benefit everyone,
however, even if they increase the efficiency of the system as a whole or
contribute to greater wealth. Should reforms be judged against a Pareto
or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard?30 Even highly technical reforms
have a political dimension, as they produce winners and losers in terms
of distribution of economic resources, distribution of power among state
organs, or the strengthening of some legal actors at the expense of oth-
ers-favoring criminals and the defense bar over members of the general
public who assign a higher priority to social order, for example. If the
discussion below demonstrates anything, it is that the legal reform proc-
ess in China has entered a complicated and intensely political phase.
Should reforms be judged against a standard of equity or justice re-
flecting current human rights standards? Should this assessment treat all
rights in the ever-expanding corpus of rights treaties equally? Should it
privilege civil and political rights over social and economic rights, as has
long been and continues to be the case, or vice versa? Widely reported
cases of China's egregious violations of civil and political rights often
overshadow its tremendous progress in rebuilding the legal system and
its performance on other indicators of human wellbeing, where it outper-
forms the average state in its lower-middle income class.3'
A second concern in assessing reforms is whether to employ an ab-
solute or relative standard. Rule of law and other good governance
indicators are highly correlated with wealth, as are civil and political
rights and social and economic rights.3 This suggests China's perform-
ance in these areas should be judged against the performance of other
30. A change that can make at least one individual better off without making any other
individual worse off is a Pareto improvement: an allocation of resources is Pareto efficient
when no further Pareto improvements can be made. An outcome is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if
those that are made better off could in theory compensate those that are made worse off and
produce a Pareto optimal outcome. Kaldor-Hicks, however, does not require that those made
worse off are in fact compensated and thus may lead to negative distributional consequences.
31. See Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Stan-
dard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71 (2005) [hereinafter Assessing Human Rights in China]
(arguing that China is subject to a double standard on rights issues in part because of the privi-
leging of civil and political rights and the bias against non-democratic regimes).
32. See Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth in De-
termining Rights Performance in Asia, 15 DUKE INT'L L.J. 75 (2005).
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states at its income level, not against the performance of much wealthier
states-much less against the aspirations of human rights groups.
Moreover, regulatory reforms may require time to take hold. What
may seem like a terrible mistake may prove successful with the passing
of time. Some reforms may also set the stage for further development.
Intermediate benchmarks are necessary to avoid unduly dismissive as-
sessments because of disappointing progress on long term goals.33
II. CASE STUDIES OF LEGAL REFORMS
A. Rule of Law
One of the biggest regulatory innovations in China in the last 25
years has been the transition to rule of law (the only other comparable
change being the transition to a market economy, which entails certain
modalities of regulation, including rule of law, in a state the size of
China with a reasonably developed economy). Some may doubt the tran-
sition to rule of law is an innovation, even allowing that the move toward
a more law-based regulatory system represents a drastic change from
Mao-era governance. Indeed, many commentators describe China's ef-
forts to implement rule of law in terms of a transplant deduced from a
predetermined foreign model and implemented in top-down fashion by
the central government. The assumption is often that China is moving
toward a liberal democratic conception of rule of law. This assumption is
unfounded, at least for the short term (and, I have argued, for the me-
dium and long terms as well), and misses the innovative quality of rule
of law in China.34 China has not attempted to mimic some ideal Western
legal order, much less import wholesale a liberal democratic rule of
law.35 The first hint that something might be awry with the standard as-
33. LINN HAMMERGREN, INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING AND JUSTICE REFORM 1
(U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., PC-ACD-020, 1998), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
publicsector/legal/Institutional%2OStrengthening.pdf.
34. One common view among Western commentators is that China should be moving
toward liberal democratic rule of law and that, ultimately, economic reforms, greater wealth,
and the rise of a middle class seeking to protect their property interests will lead to demands
for democracy and liberal rights. As a normative matter, democracy and liberalism are con-
tested in China, the latter more than the former. As an empirical matter, other states have
become wealthy and resisted democratization for years, and even after democratization they
have not become liberal democracies in the sense that the outcome on many rights issues is
more communitarian or collectivist than liberal. See CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15
(distinguishing between four thick conceptions of rule of law, including liberal democratic,
statist socialist, neoauthoritarian, and communitarian, and arguing that China is not likely to
embrace liberal democracy or liberal democratic rule of law).
35. Donald C. Clarke, Alternative Approaches to Chinese Law: Beyond the "Rule of
Law" Paradigm, 2 WASEDA PROC. OF COMP. L. 49 (1998-1999) (cautioning against the teleo-
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sumption/description is the government's declaration, now incorporated
into the Chinese constitution, that China is in the process of establishing
a socialist rule of law state. To be sure, there are competing conceptions
of rule of law in China, as there are elsewhere.36 In addition to the gov-
ernment's statist socialist version of rule of law, there is support in China
for neo-authoritarian, communitarian, and even liberal democratic varie-
ties.
The complexity of the process of implementing rule of law in China
illustrates the previously discussed shortcomings in commonly used
metaphors. The process has involved much more innovation from the
bottom than usually suggested. At minimum, it is fair to say the process
has been both top-down and bottom-up. Nor does the deduc-
tive/inductive distinction seem very useful when applied to the question
of why Chinese leaders endorsed rule of law after Mao. Chinese leaders
faced a lack of economic growth, a history of arbitrary rule in the hands
of a single person, and flagging legitimacy, among other problems. They
may have induced from the examples of other states that rule of law
might be a solution to these problems. Or perhaps they deduced this
conclusion from the general principle (itself derived from empirical stud-
ies and case studies) that rule of law contributes to economic growth,
limits government arbitrariness, and enhances legitimacy.
Horizontal metaphors are equally problematic, highlighting the
Western origin of rule of law despite the fact that China embarked on
legal reforms for its own purposes, driven primarily by domestic con-
cerns. Even allowing that reformers have looked to foreign legal systems
for guidance, the conception and implementation of rule of law in
China-as reflected in current institutions, rules and practices-are sig-
nificantly different from any existing legal system in the West or any
paradigmatic "Western rule of law ideal." Describing China's rule of law
as a transplant or translation of an original Western prototype fails to
capture its significant indigenous contribution to a new and unique
model: socialist rule of law.
Of course, many will question whether a socialist rule of law is truly
rule of law, especially given the many imperfections in the Chinese legal
system and China's well-documented human rights abuses.37 This concern
logical assumption that the end state of legal reform is meant to be, or likely to be, the "West-
ern rule of law ideal").
36. CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 55; see also ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE
OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES,
FRANCE AND THE U.S.A. (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) [hereinafter ASIAN DISCOURSES OF
RULE OF LAW].
37. See Clarke, supra note 35 (questioning whether China has a legal system); see also
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AFTER MAO 3 (1999)
(also questioning whether China has a legal system).
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reflects a second shortcoming with horizontal metaphors mentioned ear-
lier: they offer little guidance in telling us whether changes amount to a
odd-looking transplant, a hybrid, or a new species altogether. 8
Nor do horizontal metaphors shed much light on why some features
of reforms are adopted and others rejected. Defenders of rule of law with
"Chinese characteristics" or "native resources" provide precious little
guidance regarding which characteristics will or should become part of
rule of law. In the end, these slogans serve mainly to caution that im-
ported ideas, rules, and practices will be adapted in light of local
circumstances. This is true, of course. But which factors will determine
the fate of foreign or indigenous elements? What influences will decide
whether attempts to implement rule of law fail or succeed?
The factors affecting the implementation of rule of law in China are
likely similar to those affecting the implementation of rule of law else-
where. Among these, the nature of the political system has received the
most attention in China, with many commentators arguing that rule of
law is incompatible with single party socialism. 39 Empirical studies have
shown that democracy and rule of law tend to be reinforcing, albeit
weakly.40 Democracy, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient for
rule of law.'
For instance, despite the Singaporean government's many limitations
on the democratic process, its use of the legal system to suppress opposi-
tion, and its nonliberal interpretation of many rights issues, Singapore's
38. For a response to Clarke and Lubman's claims that China lacks a legal system and
an attempt to sort out different approaches to defining the minimal requirements of rule of law
and answer the question of whether we will know rule of law when we see it, see CHINA'S
LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 130-41. Briefly stated, the argument is that there is consider-
able agreement about the elements of a thin (or procedural) rule of law. There is, however,
considerable disagreement about thick (or substantive) conceptions of rule of law in China and
elsewhere.
39. Here I only discuss regime type. Many other political factors might be considered.
Democracy, for example, could be broken down into constitutive elements and each element
tested. See Gerardo L. Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy:
Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 CoMP. POL. STUD. 5 (2002); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et
al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights, 49 INT'L STUD.
Q. 439 (2005), available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/phd-hire/cherif_2.pdf.
40. Roberto Rigobon & Dani Rodrik, Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income:
Estimating the Interrelationships 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. W10750,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=590745.
41. What constitutes a democracy is also subject to debate. In the United Kingdom,
only 1.8% of the adult population was eligible to vote as of 1832 and only 12.1% as of 1884,
with women receiving the right to vote only in 1930. In the United States, only 5% of adults
were eligible to vote in 1824, with blacks obtaining the right to vote only in 1870 and women
following in 1920. ZAKARIA, supra note 26, at 50-51.
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legal system ranks as one of the best in the world."2 Like Singapore,
Hong Kong has a well-developed legal system that is largely the product
of British colonialism. Until the handover to the PRC in 1997, the sys-
tem was widely considered an exemplar of rule of law, notwithstanding
its lack of democracy and the restricted scope of individual rights under
British rule. After the handover, the legal system continues to score high
on the World Bank's Rule of Law Index, with only a slight drop from
90.4 in 1996 to 86.6 in 2002.43 Among Middle Eastern countries, Oman,
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are in the top
quartile on the World Bank rule of law index but have a zero ranking on
the 0-10 point Polity IV Index."4
Conversely, just as non-democracies may have strong rule of law-
compliant legal systems, democracies may have legal systems that fall
far short of rule of law. Guatemala, Kenya, and Papua New Guinea, for
example, all score highly on democracy (8-10 on the Polity IV Index)
and yet score poorly on rule of law (below the 25th percentile on the
World Bank rule of law index).
In short, regime type will influence the contours of rule of law in
China and may place some constraints on its implementation, particu-
larly with respect to cases involving political issues that threaten the rule
of the Party. 6 China clearly has made great strides in recent years toward
42. See Li-ann Thio, Rule of Law within a Non-liberal "Communitarian" Democracy:
the Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 183 (Randall Peerenboom
ed., 2004).
43. Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-
2002 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3106, 2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf.
44. Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Country Reports (2003), at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm
45. Eight other states receive an 8-10 score on the Polity IV index and yet score below
the 50th percentile of states on rule of law: Bolivia, Peru, Jamaica, Macedonia, the Philip-
pines, Moldova, Nicaragua, and Argentina. Id.
46. Only after democratization did the courts in Taiwan and South Korea emerge as
independent and authoritative forces capable of handling even politically sensitive issues in-
volving controversial constitutional amendments and the criminal liability of past presidents
impartially. See generally Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th
Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y. J. 531 (2002)
(observing that just a few years ago no one could imagine that the Council of Grand Justices
would find newly-amended constitutional provisions unconstitutional); Hahm Chaihark, Rule
of Law in South Korea: Rhetoric and Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW
385 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004). Democratization in other states, however, has exacer-
bated or at least failed to resolve shortcomings in the legal system, including problems with
the authority and independence of the judiciary. In Indonesia, corporatist and clientelist ties
between judges and the political, military, and business elite have undermined the authority
and independence of the judiciary. In the Philippines, the courts continue to be so heavily
influenced by the politics of populist, people-power movements that basic rule of law princi-
ples are threatened. Howard Dick, Why Law Reforms Fail: Indonesia's Anti-corruption
Reforms, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed.,
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implementing a legal system that meets the requirements of a thin rule of
law, and it may continue to do so for years to come before reaching its
potential within the current political structure. On the other hand,
China's political regime has created some institutions and practices, such
as review by adjudicative committees and individual case supervision by
the procuracy and people's congress, that would be difficult to reconcile
with conceptions of judicial independence and separation of power prin-
ciples in liberal democracies.
Commentators have also cited cultural factors to explain many of
China's problems, with some arguing that the state's Confucian heritage,
authoritarian past, and reliance on social networks may prevent or at
least complicate the implementation of rule of law. When starkly stated,
this view verges on Orientalism.47 Clearly, other Asian states have im-
plemented legal systems that score highly on rule of law indices.
Cultural factors may nevertheless play a role in implementation of rule
of law and in the adoption and operation of particular institutions or the
application of particular rules.4'8 For instance, Chinese citizens infre-
quently invoke administrative litigation in part because they are still
adjusting to the idea of suing state officials. Differences in local customs
and national laws may lead to implementation deviating from the law on
the books, especially in criminal law and family law issues. Similarly,
traditional attitudes toward substantive justice sometimes lead to inflated
expectations of the legal system and frivolous or excessive litigation, in
forthcoming 2006); Raul C. Pangalangan, The Philippine "People Power" Constitution, Rule
of Law, and the Limits of Liberal Constitutionalism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW,
supra note 36, at 371 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
47. See Randall Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China's Alien
"Legal System," 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 37 (2003) (distinguishing between two
kinds of Orientalism, one that denies China could ever establish rule of law given its cultural
traditions and the other attempting to impose on China a particular thick conception of liberal
democratic rule of law as the only appropriate model worth pursuing). See also Teemu Rus-
kola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
48. AMIR N. LICHT ET AL., CULTURE RULES: THE FOUNDATIONS OF RULE OF LAW AND
OTHER NoRMs OF GOVERNANCE (2004), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=314559. The study found that states that emphasized autonomy and egalitarianism had
higher levels of rule of law, accountability, and less corruption, whereas states that emphasized
embeddedness and hierarchy had a lower level of rule of law, accountability, and worse cor-
ruption. In short, English-speaking areas and Western Europe scored significantly higher than
other regions. The authors suggest that cultural orientation in East Asia may make it more
difficult to implement rule of law, restrict corruption, and increase accountability or that "good
governance" in Asia may differ in some respects from "good governance" in Western liberal
democracies. Good governance in Asian states no doubt differs in significant respects from
good governance in rich, liberal democratic Western states once one examines in more detail
the broad variables of rule of law, accountability, and corruption. Nevertheless, Asian states
have outperformed other regions in terms of rule of law on the same World Bank good gov-
emance scales used by the authors of the study, suggesting that culture may not be as
important, at least in Asia, as the authors claim.
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which parties ask the court to compensate for shortcomings in the wel-
fare system or the lack of unemployment insurance-even if that entails
setting aside the law and acting illegally in the name of equity or social
justice. 9
Culture, however, is not the main obstacle to the realization of rule
of law in China. Many of the most serious impediments are institutional.
Twenty-five years of reforms have greatly strengthened the courts, pro-
curacy, police, legal profession, administrative law, and legislative
systems. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. ° In part, the weakness
of these institutions is simply a function of time. It takes decades to cre-
ate efficient, professional, and clean institutions. It also takes time to
change institutional culture. There continues to be a heavy administrative
flavor to Chinese courts, although recent reforms have begun to break
down the internal administrative hierarchy by providing more internal
independence and decision-making authority for judicial panels and by
promoting presiding judges based on performance and ability. Adminis-
trative law reforms, including the passage of administrative litigation
laws allowing citizens to challenge the decisions of government officials,
conflicted with the longstanding belief that government officials had
wide discretion and were accountable to those above but beyond direct
challenge from those below. Government officials continue to come to
grips with the change in institutional purpose. Whereas administration
previously meant regulation and management, these goals must now
compete with the need to facilitate (private) economic transactions and
protect rights. This shift in institutional mission is reflected in the recent
passage of the Administrative Licensing Law and attempts to reduce the
number of approvals and licenses, as well as in the ongoing efforts to
pass an Administrative Procedure Law that will open up the administra-
tive rulemaking process to more participation by interested parties.
China's institutional problems, however, are also a function of
wealth. Indeed, rule of law everywhere is largely a function of wealth."
At very low levels of development, the formal legal system may not play
49. Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Accountability and Judicial Independence: An Em-
pirical Study of Individual Case Supervision in the People's Republic of China, 55 CHINA
JOURNAL (forthcoming 2006).
50. See generally, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15.
51. See Peerenboom, supra note 23 (finding that the correlation between GDP and
ranking on World Bank rule of law index for all states is r=.82); Alberto Chong & Csar Cal-
der6n, Causality and Feedback between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth, 12
ECON. & POL. 69-81 (2000) (using time series data, the authors find that the causal relation-
ship between institutions and economic growth runs in both directions but that the impact of
greater growth on institutional development is stronger than the impact of institutions on
growth); cf. Rigobon and Rodrik, supra note 40 (while democracy and rule of law are both
related to higher GDP levels, the impact of rule of law is much stronger).
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a great role in the economy, but the demand for an efficient and fair legal
system rises as the economy develops. This leads to more investment in
institutions, including higher salaries and more training, as well as the
creation of mechanisms of accountability to ensure efficient and fair out-
comes. These measures include anti-corruption commissions, internal
review processes, and, in China, channels for individual case supervision
by the procuracy and people's congress. The result is more professional-
ism and better performance. But such changes take time and resources.
Developing states simply cannot afford some of the "solutions" to insti-
tutional problems available to richer states. For example, judges in many
of the legal systems that score the highest on rule of law indices tend to
be highly paid by developing state standards. Yet increasing salaries to
the point where judges need not rely on corruption to live a decent life
may not be possible in China given the other pressing financial demands
on the government. In response to the comment from a German lawyer
at an international conference in Beijing that judicial corruption is not a
major problem in Germany because judges are highly paid, a member of
the PRC judiciary noted that some poor counties in western China often
owe judges several months back pay.
How then do we assess efforts to implement rule of law in China?
The assessment will differ depending on the timeframe. Taking a snap-
shot view, many problems remain. Individuals living and working in the
system are likely to be frustrated by ongoing problems and highly criti-
cal of the implementation process. If one considers, however, that rule of
law took centuries to establish in Western states, the progress in China in
less than 30 years is remarkable.
Similarly, comparing China against the standards of legal systems in
the United States or Europe, or worse yet against an idealized version of
those legal systems or the utopian, perfectionist requirements of human
rights activists, will result in bitter disappointment about "the lack of
rule of law in China." But one cannot compare China's legal system
against the standard of other developing states without feeling positive
about Chinese accomplishments to date. The outcome of the rule of law
assessment will also depend on which aspect of the legal system one fo-
cuses on. The quality of the judiciary varies by the level of the court, the
division within the court, the region, and the type of case.13 Many of the
worst problems with judicial corruption and competence are in basic
level courts. On the whole, courts in the more developed eastern region
52. Of course, judicial corruption is not only a matter of low salaries. See CHINA'S
LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 280.
53. See Hualing Fu, Putting China's Judiciary into Perspective: Is It Independent,
Competent and Fair?, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE
RULE OF LAW 193 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
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and in larger cities are more advanced than courts in the western or mid-
dle region and in small towns. Of course, a professional, competent, and
honest judiciary is only one of the institutions required for a functional
legal system: the legislature, police, and procuracy, as well as the legal,
notary, and accounting professions, are all progressing at different rates
and confronting their own set of sometimes overlapping issues.
In addition, different areas of law progress at different rates. The
Chinese judicial system has particular problems with two types of cases.
The first involves direct threats to the regime arising from political dissi-
dents, potentially disruptive religious-based movements such as
Falungong, labor activists, and minority rights activists, including Tibet-
ans and Xinjiang Muslims claiming self-determination. These types of
cases are problematic because they challenge the legitimacy of Party
rule. They are also problematic because China is relatively unstable and
thus the government must proceed with caution given the high potential
for, and horrific consequences of, social chaos. Criminal law is the other
main trouble spot for the legal system, but its complications arise for
different reasons, as explained below.
Many reforms have increased the efficiency and the fairness of the
Chinese legal system as a whole, as indicated in China's higher scores on
the World Bank rule of law index, which largely reflects the elements of
a thin or procedural rule of law. Evaluating the system in terms of
broader standards such as justice or human rights is more controversial
because justice means different things to different people and human
rights are much contested, especially when moving beyond the broad
wish list of abstract rights in international treaties to the interpretation
and implementation of those broad provisions in practice. In China
alone, liberals, communitarians, neo-authoritarians, and statist socialists
are likely to disagree over many specific issues, from the proper balance
to draw between national security and the freedoms of speech and asso-
ciation to the proper standards of judicial interpretation. 4
With the exception of civil and political rights, China generally out-
performs the average state in its income class on most major human
rights and well-being indicators. To be sure, overall improvement is con-
sistent with great regional variation and worsening conditions for some."
Yet such problems are generally beyond the power of the courts to re-
solve and thus require a political solution. Indeed, legal reform is an
inherently political process. This is evident in the attempts to provide
fairer trials in criminal cases by adopting a series of reforms aimed at
producing a more adversarial system, as well as in the adoption of
54. CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 71-109.
55. See Assessing Human Rights in China, supra note 31.
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simplified procedures and the debates over whether to eliminate admin-
istrative detention.
B. Criminal Law: A Rocky Road to an Adversarial System
One of the most significant reforms in criminal law was the transi-
tion from an inquisitorial system to a more adversarial system in the
mid-1990s. In an inquisitorial system, a judge or prosecutor carries out
the pretrial investigation; detention periods tend to be long, with little
role for the lawyer, who is often limited to brief visits with the accused
after the initial questioning; at trial, the judge actively pursues the truth
by questioning witnesses and overseeing the production of evidence. The
process is structured as a search for truth conducted by impartial officers
of the state. In contrast, in an adversarial system the process is structured
as a contest between the parties. Judges are not involved in pretrial inves-
tigation; lawyers play a much larger role both before and during the trial;• 56
and the judge serves as a passive umpire during the proceedings.
Thus, the move to an adversarial system in China radically altered
the role of procuratorates, judges, and lawyers. The 1996 amendments
also provided a number of rights to protect the accused, including earlier
access to a lawyer, the right to review documents and call witnesses, the
right to post bail, and limits on the length of detention.
The extent to which these changes were attributable to foreign pres-
sure as opposed to domestic demands is difficult to determine, as
China's criminal system was under attack both abroad and at home by
those working within the legal system. Again, China did not simply at-
tempt to import wholesale a particular foreign model-much to the
dismay of foreign critics.5 Nevertheless, the changes clearly reflected a
shift from an inquisitorial system toward an adversarial one, and thus the
new model could be considered more of an import than a homegrown
product (although the inquisitorial model itself was an earlier import
from Germany and Japan). The change reflected the increased familiarity
of Chinese reformers with U.S. law and the prestige and power of the
United States, which arguably has led to the Americanization of criminal
56. See Langer, supra note 5, for a more extensive discussion of adversarial and in-
quisitorial systems.
57. For a discussion and critique of the amendments, see JONATHAN HECHT, LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM?: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 19-76 (1996); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
WRONGS AND RIGHTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 27-
61 (1998).
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law (as seen in the trend to interpret the rights provided in the ICCPR
and other international treaties in terms of an adversarial model).58
The central authorities hailed the changes as a milestone on the road
to rule of law and issued the usual notices to the relevant state actors,
urgently encouraging them to faithfully implement the reforms. Unfortu-
nately, implementation has proven exceedingly disappointing. Lawyers
have been routinely denied access to their clients, prosecutors have re-
fused to turn over exculpatory evidence or provide defense counsel
access to all the information in the dossier, defense counsel have been
unable to question key witnesses who fail to appear at court, the high
rate of confessions has reduced the role of lawyers to the seeking of le-
niency, and allegations of torture remain common. 9
What accounts for these difficulties? Are they the result of political
ideology-the repressive authoritarian state out to persecute criminal
defendants and repress political dissidents-as commonly suggested in
Western news accounts? Political ideology is at best only a small factor.
Most cases are run-of-the-mill criminal cases involving theft, murder,
rape, drugs, and the like. While crime disrupts social order, criminals do
not directly challenge the Party's right to rule. To be sure, the Chinese
government has an interest in maintaining law and order, as do all gov-
ernments. But what distinguishes criminal law from other areas of law is
the lack of public support for criminal law reforms; the majority of the
citizenry see such reforms as harming, rather than furthering, their inter-
ests. At the same time, there is little political support for criminals. The
government has responded to the fears of the public by acceding to
58. Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence, in LEGAL
CULTURE AND LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1996); see also Langer, supra note 5 (arguing that while U.S. influence may be producing
deep changes in other legal systems, these systems may still diverge in important ways); Diane
Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an Interna-
tional Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 850 (2000) (noting reservations regarding the adoption of
common law norms and practices with respect to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda).
59. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, EMPTY PROMISES: HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
AND CHINA'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW IN PRACTICE (2001); Ping Yu, Glittery Promise vs.
Dismal Reality: The Role of the Criminal Lawyer in the People's Republic of China After the
1996 Revision of the Criminal Procedure Law, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 827, 835 (2002);
CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM'N ON CHINA, 107TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/2002annRptEng.pdf (claiming, inter alia, that the im-
pact of reforms of the Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law has been minimal on the
protection of criminal suspects and defendants; China's criminal justice system is subject to
manipulation by authorities; torture remains widespread; and access to lawyers is often de-
nied); CHEN WEIDONG, XINGSHI SUSONGFA SHISHI WENTI DIAOYAN BAOGAO [Survey Report
on the Problems in Implementation of Criminal Procedure Law] (2001); Jerome Cohen, The
Plight of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Statement at the Congressional-Executive Commission
Roundtable Discussion on Challenges for Criminal Justice in China (July 26, 2002), available
at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/072602/cohen.php.
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demands to crack down on crime. Thus, interest group politics explain
much of China's harsh approach on crime, much as they account for the
war on crime in other states.
The harsh treatment of criminals is also the result of cultural factors,
including majoritarian preferences for social stability, a tendency to fa-
vor the interest of the group over the individual, and the lack of a strong
tradition of individual rights. The traditional Chinese emphasis on sub-
stantive justice also makes it harder to take the procedural rights of
criminals seriously.
Economic factors and social change also play an important role in
undermining efforts at criminal reform. Industrialization, urbanization,
and the transition to a market economy generally lead to rising crime
rates, particularly when combined, as they usually are, with increased
social and economic inequality. Indeed, in China market reforms have
led to higher crime rates, reflecting the re-emergence of criminal activity
such as violent crime, organized crime, drug-related crime, prostitution,
and gambling.
The rise in crime as a result of economic transition has undermined
efforts to implement liberal criminal law reforms in many states. Imme-
diately after the fall of socialism, many of the former Soviet republics
enacted liberal criminal laws that afforded suspected criminals the pro-
cedural safeguards lacking during the Soviet period. The rising crime
rates that followed, however, resulted in a popular backlash that led to a
rollback in the recently enacted rights for the accused.
0
Institutional factors again play a significant role in this area. China's
weak legal institutions have been unable to resist the combined pressure
from an angry public demanding heavy punishments to deter criminals
and a political regime seeking to shore up its legitimacy by pandering to
the public's appetite for vengeance. Indeed, key institutions have not
fully committed to reforms. Not surprisingly perhaps given their law and
order orientation, the police and procuracy in particular have resisted
many of the changes. Even the judiciary has been at best lukewarm.
The amendments fundamentally altered the roles of the police,
prosecutors, judges, and defense bar, upsetting the balance of power
among them and challenging longstanding institutional norms. The po-
lice and prosecutors, who stood to lose the most, have resisted yielding
power to the courts and defense bar. The police and procuracy are in a
difficult position. On the one hand, crime rates will inevitably rise given
the larger trends of marketization, urbanization, and modernization. On
60. Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democra-
cies, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 281-82 (2002). Latin Americans have also reacted to
increased crime by curtailing liberal reforms. See HAMMERGREN, supra note 33, at 10.
[Vol. 27:823
What Have We Learned
the other hand, the police, and procuracy have lost, and will inevitably
continue to lose, power to the courts, defense bar, and the people's con-
gresses as China moves toward a more law-based order. Accordingly,
they have borne much of the blame for failing to curb crimes while si-
multaneously suffering diminished powers to fight the war. The result
has been a series of petty but highly symbolic skirmishes over status,
including debates on whether prosecutors must stand when judges enter
the room and whether judges may sit at elevated podiums. More seri-
ously, the procuracy has sought increased powers of supervision over
individual court decisions and issued a series of interpretations restrict-
ing the rights the amendments provided. These interpretations are at
odds with more accused-friendly interpretations from the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court or the even more expansive interpretations of the defense bar
and some legal academics. Meanwhile, the police have opposed legisla-
tive changes that would restrict the Ministry of Public Security's
rulemaking capacity, impose more procedural and substantive restraints
on the exercise of police power, and subject police discretion to in-
creased supervision.
Some of these problems are due to institutional inertia. For example,
the Chinese criminal system has long emphasized confessions. Similarly,
long periods of detention, lengthy interrogations, limited participation by
legal counsel in the pretrial phase, less reliance on oral evidence at trial,
brief trials before a judge without a jury, less concern for evidentiary
rules (including greater reliance on hearsay evidence), and narrower ex-
clusions of tainted evidence are all deeply embedded features of the civil
law tradition.
In sum, notwithstanding the relatively short time frame and marginal
improvements for some criminal suspects, the criminal reforms have
largely been a failure at the basic level of compliance. Perhaps they were
just too drastic, requiring a shift in power toward the courts and the de-
fense bar when the former were relatively weak and the latter even
weaker. Moreover, the reforms-although widely supported by legal
academics, the defense bar, and foreign commentators--did not receive
support from the general public. Indeed, it would be odd if the legal sys-
tem were to actually provide criminal suspects all of the rights granted
them under the laws. Given the shortcomings in the legal system as a
whole in delivering on rights protection, criminals would then receive
more protection than ordinary law-abiding citizens! One would not ex-
pect criminal law to be the leading force for legal reform or the cutting
edge for taking rights seriously.
A useful thought experiment is to consider whether reformers would
have been better off trying to build on and improve the inquisitorial
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system and whether it would be better at this stage to revert back to this
system. Most likely, any attempt to improve on the inquisitorial system
would also have met, and would still meet, with limited success. An in-
quisitorial system requires impartial and professional prosecutors and
judges committed to discovering the truth. At the time, there was little
differentiation between the criminal system and the political system, and
the level of professionalism was relatively low. Today, there is somewhat
greater differentiation and a higher level of professionalism, although the
feasibility of an impartial quest for the truth is debatable given the high
importance China assigns to the war on crime.
Nevertheless, the inquisitorial system, with its longer detention peri-
ods that reduce threats to society at the expense of individual liberty, fits
more readily with the public's desire for social stability. With its empha-
sis on truth, it also conforms more closely to the traditional Chinese
emphasis on substantive justice than does the adversarial system, which
stresses procedural justice and a fair fight between the parties. Skillful
lawyers who exonerate their clients on a technicality are even less likely
to be celebrated in China than elsewhere. Thus, an inquisitorial system
might reduce the conflicts between the defense bar and the police, procu-
racy, and courts-conflicts which have resulted in the arrests of
hundreds of lawyers for allegedly obstructing justice, inducing false tes-
timony, or fabricating evidence. It is perhaps worth noting that some of
the more successful criminal law systems in Asia (and indeed the world)
are primarily inquisitorial, including the Japanese system.6' Although
61. Although Japan has adopted a more adversarial system since World War II, the
system retains many of the features of an inquisitorial system, including the emphasis on the
search for truth carried out by impartial and professional prosecutors, the distrust of defense
counsel and the limits on counsel's ability to meet with the accused and conduct discovery, the
long periods of detention during investigation, the limited access to bail for those who have
not confessed, and the relaxed rules of evidence that allow for consideration of hearsay evi-
dence and the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. While such features seem alien to a
U.S. lawyer steeped in the adversarial tradition (with trial by a lay jury) and may in certain
cases lead to abuse or miscarriages of justice, they must be viewed in terms of a highly profes-
sional procuracy that goes to great lengths to ensure that the facts of the case are clear, the
punishment both fits the defendant and the crime, and the punishment is consistent with other
similarly situated defendants whose circumstances are explored in great detail. Furthermore,
the Japanese system seeks not only or even primarily punishment in most cases. Rather, the
emphasis is on rehabilitation and reintegration of the accused into society. DAVID T. JOHNSON,
THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE 74, 84 (2002) (noting that in Japan, "[1]awyers are not permit-
ted to be present during interrogation;" suspects have the right to remain silent but may be and
often are interrogated for hours at a time for up to 23 days; fewer than 10% of suspects secure
the services of a lawyer during the investigative phase; prosecutors typically limit contact
between the lawyer and the accused to three short visits of fifteen minutes each if the accused
has not yet confessed; and "[p]rosecutors, police and prison guards may censor written com-
munications between the accused and defense counsel"). Despite some areas of concern,
Johnson concludes the "normative bottom line" is that "the Japanese way of justice is uncom-
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Japan, Taiwan, and other states are under pressure from human rights
critics to adopt a more liberal rights-based approach, whether such an
approach would be successful is doubtful given public attitudes.62 In
sum, while all criminal justice systems suffer from serious flaws, an in-
63
quisitorial system might better suit China's current circumstances.
C. The New Summary and Simplified Procedures:
Balancing Justice and Efficiency
In response to the rising number of criminal cases and the heavy
burden imposed on criminal judges, the Supreme Court, Supreme Procu-
ratorate, and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued regulations in early
2003 that provided for summary procedures in regular criminal cases.4
Summary procedures are now an option in criminal cases in which the
facts are clear, the defendant admits guilt, the evidence is sufficient, and
the maximum potential punishment is less than three years in prison. A
single judge oversees the trial, as opposed to the usual panel of three
judges.6 In keeping with the traditional Chinese emphasis on
monly just," especially in comparison to the punitive and highly dysfunctional criminal justice
system United States. Id. at 280.
62. See, e.g., Jeff Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Hu-
man Rights Abuses in the Japanese Penal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 329 (2003). In
recent years, the Constitutional Court in Talwan has exercised its newfound authority by
greatly expanding the rights of criminal suspects, notwithstanding similar views among the
Taiwanese public, as in China, regarding the need to wage war on crime. In 1991, 58% of
Taiwanese approved of executing criminals in public, 68% endorsed passing special laws to
attack crime, and 59% believed that punishment was more important than compensation for
the injured. In 1999, over two-thirds thought punishments were too lenient, while only 1%
thought punishments were too harsh. Furthermore, over 42% believed that suspects could be
detained, even if there was not sufficient evidence to prove them guilty of serious crime, as
long as there was reasonable suspicion. See Tsung-fu Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan: Cul-
ture, Ideology, and Social Change, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 374, 400
(Stephen C. Hsu ed., 2003) (arguing that without support for the protection of human rights, it
is doubtful that rule of law can be realized in Taiwan--or at least the liberal democratic ver-
sion of rule of law entailed by such rights).
63. There is little if any chance that China will revert back to an inquisitorial system:
the global trend is toward an adversarial (if not American) model; human rights organizations
would have a fit; domestic reformers and legal academics, many of them trained in the United
States, would oppose the changes; and central authorities are unlikely to reverse themselves so
soon after the decision in the mid-1990s to move toward an adversarial model.
64. ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYU SHIYONG JIANYI CHENGXU SHENLI GONGSU
ANJIAN DE RUOGAN YIJIAN [Supreme People's Court's Several Opinions on Applying Sum-
mary Procedures to Try Cases of Public Prosecution] (2003).
65. Summary procedures are likely to give rise to additional cases of corruption and
improper influence because it is easier to corrupt one judge than a panel of three. In most
cases, however, judges will be wary about not convicting defendants if the judge has accepted
bribes, since their actions are likely to be carefully scrutinized in light of the strike-hard cam-
paign. In addition, the procuratorate has the right to challenge the decision through the kangsu
procedure. Recently, the Supreme Court has also issued rules that hold individual judges ac-
countable for mistaken decisions. See CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15, at 297-98. The
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rehabilitation, judges are instructed to treat leniently those who voluntar-
ily admit guilt.
At the same time, the Supreme Court, Supreme Procuratorate, and
Ministry of Justice jointly issued regulations that streamlined the proce-
dures in ordinary criminal cases. 6 The regulations apply to cases of first
instance in which the defendant raises no objection to the basic facts and
voluntarily admits guilt. In contrast to summary procedures, the case is
still tried by a panel of three judges rather than a single judge.
The move toward simplified procedures began as an unapproved lo-
cal experiment and thus is another example of a bottom-up innovation.
Indeed, at the time, critics pointed out that the simplified procedures
were at odds with the Criminal Procedure Law. The procedures resemble
plea bargaining, which inquisitorial systems have traditionally shunned
because it is inconsistent with their emphasis on impartial discovery of
the truth. In recent years, however, Italy, France, Argentina, and other
inquisitorial systems have adopted plea bargaining institutions, although
they differ in important ways from the U.S. model.67 Whether PRC advo-
cates of summary and simplified procedures deduced or induced the new
procedures in light of plea-bargaining models in other states-and thus
whether the changes are to some extent a foreign transplant-is hard to
say. Surely judges in China all have some familiarity with plea bargain-
ing-at the very least from U.S. television and movies. Yet judges were
also responding to local circumstances.
Again, the criminal reforms are not simply a matter of blindly copy-
ing a particular foreign model. The two regulations attempt to address
efficiency problems without going so far as to accept a U.S.-style plea
bargaining system. The summary procedures are limited to cases with a
maximum potential sentence of three years, and the simplified proce-
dures cannot be used in cases in which the death penalty is possible. In
contrast, in the United States, even offenders charged with crimes sub-
ject to capital punishment may plea bargain. Both the summary and
simplified procedures also differ from U.S.-style plea bargaining in that
the defendant and procuratorate do not agree in advance to a (recom-
mended) sentence or, in the case of charge-bargaining, to the charges.
Rather, the judge or judicial panel has the final authority to set the sen-
tence, subject to the proviso that those who voluntarily confess should be
treated leniently. Given the wide range of possible sentences, and the
rules have not been used much to date, in part because of the collective nature of judicial deci-
sionmaking, which makes it difficult to hold individual judges accountable.
66. GUANYU SHIYONG PUTONG CHENGXU SHENLI "BEIGAO RENZUI ANJIAN" DE
RUOGAN YIJIAN (SHJXING) [Several Opinions on Applying Ordinary Procedure to Try "Cases
in Which the Defendant Pleaded Guilty" (Trial Implementation)] (2003).
67. See Langer, supra note 5.
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inevitable vagueness in determining what counts as serious or aggravat-
ing circumstances, judges still retain considerable discretion in
determining the sentence. On the other hand, the summary and simpli-
fied procedures are more oriented toward substantive justice and
ascertaining the truth than U.S. plea bargaining. The judge must confirm
that the defendant's acts do in fact constitute a crime and that the evi-
dence is sufficient to support the charge. Thus, it is not possible, at least
in theory, for the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge that clearly
does not fit the facts in exchange for a lighter sentence, as happens in the
U.S. system. The court must also verify that the defendant has voluntar-
ily admitted guilt, thus giving defendants who wish to repudiate their
confessions an opportunity to do so and to raise any claims of torture or
coercion. Moreover, rather than giving up the right to trial completely,
the defendant has the right to make a statement and present "a defense"
in order to explain the situation and persuade the court to 
act leniently.6 1
Although the new rules are at odds with traditional inquisitorial
processes, they are consistent with the longstanding tradition in China of
emphasizing rehabilitation and confessions in exchange for leniency,
which may explain their quick adoption. The procedures may also have
benefited from the championing of the Haidian court in Beijing, which is
known for its progressive nature and highly qualified judges (since many
judges are willing to take lower positions than they might receive else-
where to stay in Beijing). Perhaps more importantly, the changes
enjoyed widespread support among key institutional players. Judges,
prosecutors, and lawyers all benefit from a process to quickly resolve
cases. Judges can avoid making tough calls and risking reversal on ap-
peal. Prosecutors can meet their case quotas with less effort and ensure
convictions. Lawyers, who can rarely charge high fees given the low
economic status of most criminals, can rely on volume to generate in-
come while still claiming success based on their ability to obtain a
lenient sentence.
Even though the new procedures are too recent to assess empirically,
the advantages and disadvantages of plea bargaining in general are well
known.69 While some scholars debate the need for plea bargaining, most
68. The system is therefore similar to the German plea-bargaining system. Id.
69. For critical accounts, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defen-
dant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931
(1983); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 3 (1978); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). For positive accounts,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909
(1992). For a thought-provoking description by a former public defender and prosecutor, see
David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 115 (1994) (noting that in seven state counties in the United States, 100% of convictions
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concede that legal systems could not function without it-at least with-
out devoting considerably more resources to criminal cases than the
public is likely to approve. Plea bargaining's main disadvantages are
normative. Even supporters acknowledge that it deviates from the image
of a criminal justice system that protects the rights of the accused
through elaborate procedures culminating in a trial by a jury of one's
peers:
The criminal process that law students study and television
shows celebrate is formal, elaborate, and expensive. It involves
detailed examination of witnesses and physical evidence, tough
adversarial argument from attorneys for the government and de-
fense, and fair-minded decision-making from an impartial judge
and jury. For the vast majority of cases in the real world, the
criminal process includes none of these things. Trials occur only
occasionally-in some jurisdictions [in the United States], they
amount to only one-fiftieth of total dispositions. Most cases are
by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick conversation in
a prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys
familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses pre-
sent, leading to a proposed resolution that is then "sold" to both
the defendant and the judge. To a large extent, this kind of horse
trading determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is
what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.7"
Most significantly, the accused often have little choice but to accept
whatever the prosecution offers, and some innocent people, particularly
those who are risk-averse, will accept a plea bargain and admit guilt to
avoid much heavier punishment. In China's case, the accused will likely
feel even more constrained, given high Chinese conviction rates, the
threat of a heavier punishment, and the practical obstacles to mounting
an effective defense.
If the accused does accept a deal, a judge will then review the plea;
as in other states the review will likely be formalistic and perfunctory. At
the hearing, the accused will repeat the magical words, prescribed by his
were obtained by guilty pleas without jury trials; some judges threatened-and imposed-
draconian punishments for defendants who refused to plea bargain. Judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel favored plea bargains because jury trials were much more work and fraught with
professional risk for the judge if the case was overturned on appeal, for the prosecutor if the
defendant was acquitted, and for defense counsel if the defendant was found guilty and subject
to a much heavier punishment. Meanwhile, prosecutors, far from agonizing over appropriate
sentences, made snap decisions usually within three minutes for misdemeanors and ten min-
utes for serious felonies based on only a cursory knowledge of the facts of the case.).
70. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 69, at 1911-12.
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lawyer or communicated by the police, regarding his guilt and the volun-
tariness of his plea. Nevertheless, in some cases the judge may examine
the dossier and acquit if the facts or legal basis for conviction are obvi-
ously lacking. The hearing also provides an opportunity for the accused
to allege torture or other police misconduct and to change his plea.
D. Administrative Detention: China's Second Line of Defense
Administrative detention refers to any arrangement whereby an ad-
ministrative official, rather than a judge, decides to detain a person in
physical custody under a process not governed by the Criminal Proce-
dure Law. There are several different types of administrative detention,
including: (i) administrative detention up to 15 days (xingzheng juliu)
under the Security Administrative Punishments Regulations (SAPR); (ii)
education through labor (ETL) (laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short),7
which has received most of the attention abroad and within China; (iii)
detention for education (shourong jiaoyu); (iv) compulsory drug treat-
ment (qiangzhi jiedu); (v) forced detention in psychiatric hospitals; (vi)
detention of juveniles who commit criminal offenses in juvenile centers
(shourong jiaoyangsuo) or juvenile ETL centers and detention of juve-
nile troublemakers whose actions do not amount to criminal offenses in
work-study schools (gongdu xuexiao); and (vii) stop and question (liuzhi
panwen), whereby suspects may be detained for up to 48 hours of ques-
tioning.
For present purposes, the first salient point is that the mix of types of
administration detention has changed over time. Revisions to the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law in 1996 eliminated one of the more well-known
forms of dentention--detention/shelter and investigation (shourong
shencha)-while essentially incorporating its central aspects. In June
2003, the State Council repealed the 1982 regulation regarding detention
for repatriation (shourong qiansong or DR), which mainly targeted mi-
grant workers, and issued new regulations that maintained the social
72
welfare function but removed the compulsory detention component.
The new provisional rules require authorities to inform migrant workers,
homeless people, beggars, and others without means of support about
relief centers. These centers provide food and shelter to those in need,
send them to hospitals for medical treatment if necessary, contact their
relatives, and arrange for transportation back to their homes.
71. This is often referred to as "re-education through labor" or RTL, but I shall use the
more direct translation of "education through labor."
72. See State Council Administrative Measures for Assistance to Indigent Vagrants and
Beggars in Urban Areas (2003); Ministry of Civil Affairs Detailed Implementing Rules for the
Administrative Measures for Assistance to Indigent Vagrants and Beggars in Urban Areas
(2003).
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Administrative detention of prostitutes and drug users was eliminated
and then reinstated when prostitution and drug use arose again in the
reform era.
The second important point is that the purpose and application of
administrative detention has changed as well. Whereas in the past ad-
ministrative detention was a way of dealing with political offenses,
administrative detention today mainly deals with petty criminals. The
main purpose is still to rehabilitate, retrain, and find employment for
minor offenders, encourage prostitutes to look for other ways to earn a
living, and treat drug addicts.7" Although administrative detention now
also serves more punitive and deterrent ends, it is meant to be a lesser
form of punishment than that of the decidedly harsh criminal law sys-
tem, which historically was reserved for enemies of the state and
hardcore recidivists who resisted efforts to transform them into produc-
tive members of society. Financially desperate migrants unable to find a
job or to obtain payment of their salaries and youths with too much time
of their hands and an increasing taste for the material offerings available
as a result of economic reforms are the biggest offenders. Administrative
detention is therefore an intermediate line of defense between persuasion
by family, friends, and neighbors and hard time in prisons.
Administrative detention is clearly not a transplant from contempo-
rary Western liberal democracies. In fact, human rights organizations
have demanded elimination of all forms of administrative detention, par-
ticularly education through labor. Yet the Chinese government has
resisted international and domestic pressure. Reforms to the system have
largely been the result of changing internal conditions. The State Coun-
cil, for example, had been considering reform of DR for some time, in
part because of widespread abuses of migrant workers while in custody.
What ultimately tipped the scales, however, was the public uproar over
the tragic death of college graduate Sun Zhigang while in detention. His
death led to large demonstrations in Guangdong and unprecedented peti-
tions by legal scholars challenging the legality of DR and calling for its
abolishment. The conversion of DR from a coercive mechanism for ad-
dressing surging crime and social problems caused by the influx of over
100 million migrant workers into a means of humanitarian relief was
also the result of a change in leadership. The new Hu-Wen government
sought to garner public support by presenting a humane face and to dif-
ferentiate itself from the Jiang regime by assigning a higher priority to
73. Chen Ruihua, Laodong Jiaoyang de Lishi Kaocha yu Fansi [Survey of and Reflec-
tions on the History of ET], in LIXING YU ZHIZU: ZHONGGUO LAODONG JIAOYANG ZHIDU
YANJIU [Rationality and Order: Research on China's Education Through Labor System] 1, 9,
13 (Chu Huaizhi et al. eds., 2002).
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social justice issues and the protection of those left behind by China's
economic reforms.
The future of administrative detention is difficult to predict. In gen-
eral, there are three main schools of thought. One group, consisting
primarily of liberal academics and rights activists, believes that at least
ETL and perhaps all forms of administrative detention should be elimi-
nated.7" Some in this group would incorporate some or all of the current
minor offenses handled through administrative means into the Criminal
Law but decrease the possible punishments and rely more heavily on
noncustodial sanctions such as fines, community service, and probation.
Still others would completely depenalize some offenses.
The second group, consisting mainly of government officials from
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, and the police,
favor maintaining ETL and other forms of administrative detention, al-
beit with minor reforms. They insist administrative detention is
necessary to maintain law and order given the increase in crime and its
changing nature. They also resist attempts to subject administrative de-
tention to further judicial review.
The third, and by far the largest, group would retain ETL and other
forms of detention but subject them to major reforms, including na-
tional-level legislation (a NPC law) to shore up their legal basis, clarify
the scope of offenses, and provide additional procedural constraints and
safeguards. Some in this group may prefer more drastic reforms or even
the elimination of administrative detention, particularly ETL, but they
believe abolishment is not presently possible given strong resistance
among the general public and lack of political will from the top, where
central leaders repeatedly emphasize the need to strike hard at crime.
Thus, they see major reform as a politically necessary compromise. Oth-
ers in this group, including even some liberal, reform-minded legal
scholars, believe the rise in crime and the need to ensure social stability
create a legitimate need for ETL and other forms of administrative deten-
tion while China negotiates its way through a difficult period of
economic, political, and social transition.
In terms of assessment, administrative detention is no doubt subject
to abuse and in need of reforms. As already noted, however, the formal
criminal system is no better and is worse in many ways. Eliminating all
forms of detention will likely hurt the vast majority of those the reform-
ers are seeking to help. Abolishing administrative detention will push
many marginal offenders into the harsh and decidedly unfriendly penal
system, force them to live with hardened criminals, and result in their
permanent stigmatization as convicts.
74. This group is relatively small, at least with respect to ETL. Id. at 1.
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Moreover, those subject to the formal criminal law will likely re-
ceive much longer sentences.75 Non-custodial sanctions will not be
appropriate for many of the migrant workers, prostitutes, drug users, or
youths who make up the majority of detainees. For instance, fines only
work if people have the money to pay them or at least have a job so they
can earn the money to pay them. But the unemployed youths or migrant
workers who do not find a job or do not make enough to live on as it is
do not have the means to pay fines. Nor would fines necessarily be de-
sirable in the case of prostitutes and drug addicts. To pay the fines,
prostitutes presumably would have to go back to prostituting, and drug
addicts might have to resume stealing or selling drugs.
A much more likely result than greater reliance on non-custodial
sanctions or depenalization is the creation of new ways to criminalize
behavior. This is in effect what happened when the government elimi-
nated Shelter and Investigation as a form of administrative detention but
then largely incorporated it into the criminal law and compensated
through greater reliance on DR. Similarly, the elimination of DR has
begun to give rise to new ways of handling social problems caused by
the influx of migrant workers."6 Noting that the repeal of DR led to in-
creased crime and abuse of relief centers by non-indigent individuals, the
Ministry of Public Security issued the "Notice Regarding the Strength-
ening of Current Social Order Management in Accordance with Law."
The Notice calls on public security to redouble its efforts in attacking a
variety of deviant behavior, including interfering with traffic when beg-
ging, disturbing the public order by aggressive begging in public places,
soliciting for prostitution in public places, and interfering with govern-
ment activities when petitioning officials for relief.77 Clearly worried
75. See Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 21.
76. In Jiangxi, several vagrants were rounded up and left in a remote area in freezing
temperatures as part of a city "beautification" campaign. Local government officials claimed
they lacked the funds for welfare centers. To Improve the City, Seven Patients Were Abandoned
to the Wilderness, CHINA YOUTH DAILY, June 7, 2005, available at http://zqb.cyol.comlgb/
zqb/2005-06/07/content_14928.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). Begging has become much
more prevalent in many cities. Newspapers regularly carry stories about "professional beg-
gars" who make huge sums faking illness and exploiting children to evoke pity. Public
Security officials in Guangzhou claim that 80% of the city's beggars are not genuinely indi-
gent. Erik Mobrand, Virtual Vagabonds, ASIA TIMES ON-LINE, Jan 14, 2006. Dalian has passed
anti-begging regulations. Critics charged that the regulations are unconstitutional because only
the NPC can restrict personal freedom. See Legitimacy of Local Rules, CHINA DAILY, May 18,
2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/18/content_443240.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006); Begging Bans Reveal Intolerant Society, CHINA DAILY, May 23,
2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/23/content_44469l .htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
77. Ministry of Public Security, Notice Regarding the Strengthening of Current Social
Order Management in Accordance with the Law, Doc. No. 52. The Notice also calls on public
security officers to punish activities of hooliganism that disrupt public order, such as panhan-
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about the financial and social order impact of the national regulations,
several local governments have also rushed to pass regulations that at-
tempt to shift some of the financial burden to others and clarify many of
the difficult operational issues resulting from the new policy."8 In some
cases, the local provisions allow authorities to take certain individuals to
relief centers or compel them to receive medical treatment, thus creating
exceptions to the general principle of voluntariness9
Finally, summary procedures were in response to an increase in
caseloads; the number of criminal cases in China has risen rapidly to
over 500,000 today.0 There are also more than three million minor cases
dling, camping in the open, provoking disturbances, and inciting crowds to fight in or around
such public places as offices, schools, hospitals, public squares, movie theaters, and famous
scenic spots.
78. For instance, Inner Mongolian regulations emphasized that the problems of mi-
grancy and vagrancy could only be addressed through the combined efforts of government,
society, and families. The regulations require local governments to pick up the tab for return
transportation and to help solve the economic difficulties of migrants so they do not head back
to the cities. In addition, the regulations call for the education of families regarding their re-
sponsibility to look after vagrants. They also ominously, if vaguely, warn that those who fail to
provide support will be "strictly dealt with according to law." The Mongolian government also
emphasized that the relief centers were only for the temporary assistance of those in dire cir-
cumstances who lacked the ability to meet basic living needs. The vast majority of those who
come to centers will still be sent back to their homes. In addition to reiterating that the maxi-
mum stay is ten days unless the next higher-level government department approves an
extension, the regulations limit vagrants to two stays within a six-month period. If vagrants
refuse to leave after their time is up, relief services will be terminated. If the relief centers
cannot track down the families of minors, seniors, handicapped people, and the mentally im-
paired, after 15 days the center staff is to contact the same level government to arrange for
their relocation. The regulation is silent as to where they will be relocated. The centers may
also deny services to anyone who refuses to provide accurate information about their identity,
residence, and financial resources. See Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Government,
Notice To Carry Out Well the Relief Management Work for Urban Indigent Vagrants and Beg-
gars (Aug. 15, 2003).
79. Although the Inner Mongolian regulations state that relief services are offered on a
voluntary basis, the regulations also require public security and other government officials to
take the initiative in leading minors, seniors, physically handicapped, and mentally impaired
persons without civil capacity or with limited capacity to the relief centers for supervision.
Minors are to be sent to youth centers. The mentally ill, those with contagious diseases, and
seriously ill people should first be sent to hospitals for treatment. The cost for medical treat-
ment is to be borne by relatives, employers, or the government where the person resides. Once
in the center, vagrants are not allowed to leave during the day. The regulations also call for
educational activities to help vagrants overcome their difficulties. Id. The Yunnan Provincial
Government also passed local regulations that allow the authorities to escort handicapped,
minors, seniors, and vagrants who refuse to change their behavior to relief centers. In addition,
whereas in the past local regulations allowed the authorities to send people who refused to
leave after petitioning the government to DR centers, the revised regulations simply state that
such people will be dealt with according to law. See Decision of the Yunnan Provincial Gov-
ernment Regarding the Amendment of Two Regulations Relating to Detention and
Repatriation (Sept. 10, 2003).
80. See Fu, supra note 53, at 194-95.
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handled by the police every year."' The elimination of administrative de-
tention will inevitably result in greater reliance on summary and
simplified procedures, with all the difficulties for the protection of the
rights of the accused attendant to resolving cases through plea bargain-
ing.
The complexity of the issues thus complicates the task of predicting
the path of reforms. Determining whether administrative detention
should be eliminated or, if retained, how the various types of detention
should be reformed involves numerous judgments about contested em-
pirical and normative issues and competing institutional interests. These
are at once both technical and political issues. The same is true for the
next two innovations: adjudicative committees and individual case su-
pervision.
E. Judicial Independence: Adjudicative Committees
The adjudicative committee consists of senior judges within each
court. The committee hears cases that are difficult, controversial, or im-
portant for social, economic, or political reasons.
PRC legal scholars have debated the advantages and disadvantages
of the adjudicative committee system for more than a decade. Supporters
argue that review by more senior judges is necessary in light of the low
level of competence of many jurists. They also suggest the system re-
duces corruption. Some claim the system enhances the independence of
the judiciary in that the adjudicative committee, which includes the
president and other high-ranking Party members within the court, may
be better able to resist outside influences than more junior judges. Zhu
Suli, Dean of Peking Law School, has supported the adjudicative com-
mittee as an example of a native resource that contributes to rule of law
with Chinese characteristics.
On the other hand, the vast majority of PRC legal scholars and most
international commentators oppose the system and advocate the abol-
ishment of the adjudicative committee. Under the current system, the
judges who decide a case are not those who hear it. Accordingly, the
judges who do hear the case feel they have no power. Nor do they feel
responsible for the judgment, even when it is issued in their names. Fur-
ther, critics claim judges hearing the cases become timid and are quick to
hand over tough cases to the adjudicative committee rather than working
through the issues themselves, even though doing so may result in de-
lays. In addition, the system places considerable power in the hands of
the president and vice president of the court, who have acted as gate-
81. Id.
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keepers for the adjudicative committee in the past. It may also increase
the opportunities for corruption, as disgruntled parties may persuade sen-
ior judges to intervene on their behalf. At minimum, these scholars
conclude, the system has not been an effective means of reducing judi-
cial corruption. Others counter the assertion that the system increases
independence by claiming the adjudicative committee is susceptible to
Party influence and likely to uphold the Party line.
Objections of legal scholars notwithstanding, the likelihood of abol-
ishing the adjudicative committee in the near future is low. Thus, some
scholars argue that rather than tilting at windmills, reformers should fo-
cus their energies on reducing the role of the adjudicative committee and
implementing procedural reforms to the way the committee operates.
Consistent with this strategy, the SPC's reforms to the presiding
judge system gave individual judges and the collegiate panel more power
to decide cases without the need to obtain the approval of the division
chief, president, or the adjudicative committee. The SPC's second five-
year agenda announced further reforms. The adjudicative committee is
now to hear directly major or difficult cases or those with general appli-
cability. The SPC also proposed that the court president or head of the
division join the collegial panel. Still another change is to create separate
committees for civil and criminal cases.
Foreign advisers who insist on elimination of adjudicative supervi-
sion committees as a way to conform the PRC legal system to the image
of an independent judiciary in their own states are likely to miss oppor-
tunities for marginal improvement. On the other hand, few foreign
advisers will have enough knowledge of the operation of the adjudicative
committee to provide feasible reform recommendations. Even fewer will
be aware of the ebb and flow of internal debates and thus which way the
political wind is blowing. But even if they are aware of these factors,
their ability to influence the outcome of this inherently domestic political
process is usually limited.
F. Individual Case Supervision: Balancing Judicial Independence
and Judicial Accountability
In China, legally effective "final" judicial decisions may be chal-
lenged through a process known as "individual case supervision" (gean
jiandu or ICS). This additional review procedure may be initiated by
interested parties who petition the court, procuracy, or the people's con-
gress to challenge a legally effective decision on their behalf; it may also
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be initiated, in criminal, civil, and administrative cases, by people's con-
82gresses, the procuracy, or the court acting on their own.
ICS is certainly innovative. Indeed, this type of review of individual
cases by the legislature may be unique to China, and it would run afoul
of separation of power principles in most legal systems.83 Procuracy re-
view of civil cases is also highly unusual, as is review by adjudicative
committees after the appeal process has run its course.84
ICS began locally and is thus another example of a bottom-up re-
form. Although an attempt to pass a national law in 1996 died in
committee, local governments have continued to experiment with ICS.
The Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuracy have is-
sued notices and interpretations regarding various issues arising in
conjunction with ICS, and local governments have passed many more
regulations since 1996. In terms of the inductive, innovative process de-
scribed above, the reforms encompassed problem-identification,
benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and some attempts at monitor-
ing and assessment.
Assessing the system is difficult because there is some truth to both
sides of the argument over ICS. Supporters argue it is necessary because
of the low level of professional competence of some judges, the exis-
tence of judicial corruption, and the adverse influence of local and
departmental protectionism. They claim supervision helps correct injus-
tices, promotes the rule of law, and serves a deterrent function.
Opponents argue ICS impedes judicial independence, hinders the
emergence of a more authoritative court, and leads to conflicts between
the courts and other state organs. In addition, ICS undermines the fun-
damental rule of law principles of certainty and finality: cases drag on
for years, without any procedural or time limits. As ICS often occurs
before appeal, supervision also distorts the normal appeal process.
Moreover, critics argue ICS is inefficient: a large amount of judicial re-
sources are devoted to requests for retrial, while the number of cases in
which the judgment actually changes on review is small. Furthermore,
although intended to cure the evils of corruption and local protectionism,
ICS is an ineffective solution for these systemic problems, which require
82. For civil cases, see Minshi Susongfa [Civil Procedure Law] arts. 177-85 (1991); for
criminal cases, see Xingshi Susongfa [Criminal Procedure Law] arts. 203-08 (1996); for ad-
ministrative cases, see Xingzheng Susongfa [Administrative Litigation Law] arts. 62-64
(1989). The procedure is referred to as kangsu, or protest, when the challenge is brought by
the procuracy.
83. The legislature in most legal systems may be able to pass new laws that would
result in a different outcome on similar facts in future cases, but they do not have the power to
alter the results for the parties in cases already decided by the court.
84. Some legal systems have three tiers of review as part of their normal appeal proc-
ess, in comparison to the trial plus one-appeal system in China.
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systemic solutions. Indeed, ICS itself may lead to outside influence, cor-
ruption, and local protectionism, raising the eternal question of who will
supervise the supervisors.
In general, people's views of supervision are largely a function of
their experiences and position in the system. The people's congress, as
the representative of the people, cannot ignore pressure from constitu-
ents to address what are often legitimate complaints of horrible injustice.
Procuratorates generally favor supervision because it provides another
opportunity to prosecute the case and correct their own mistakes in the
first trial. Certainly one can understand that prosecutors, who every-
where tend to be more law-and-order oriented than judges, would be
upset when judges acquit defendants the prosecutors think are guilty or
impose much lighter sentences than they believe criminals deserve. No
doubt prosecutors feel the court should accept their interpretations of the
laws and views of the facts. Moreover, as an institution, the procuracy is
unlikely to cede power easily and accept the elimination or limitation of
supervision.
Conversely, the courts are likely to resist supervision. Surely it must
be frustrating for judges to appear before a panel of people's congress
delegates to explain a decision, especially when many on the panel have
not studied law and base their interpretation of the case on a one-sided
presentation of the law and facts by one of the parties.
On the whole, parties support supervision when they win as a result
of it and oppose it when they lose. As for the public more generally, it is
doubtful that many citizens hold an accurate view of the costs and bene-
fits of supervision, the number of supervised cases, the number of
reversals, and so on. Supervision will thus likely be an ineffective way to
restore confidence and trust in the court. The tendency of the media is to
report on cases in which there has been some wrongdoing rather than
cases in which the verdict is upheld. The public is therefore likely to ob-
tain a false impression of the number of reversals after supervision and
perhaps draw the conclusion that additional ICS would reveal a similarly
high percentage of mistaken cases.
The Party and central government have no obvious stake in either
side of the argument. From their perspective, the goal is a legal system
that can issue fair and impartial judgments in most cases and thus satisfy
the need of economic actors for efficient and predictable results and the
desire of citizens for equity and just outcomes. ICS is one way to over-
come incompetence and corruption, even if at the cost of efficiency.
The number of supervised cases resulting in a change of verdict on
retrial would seem to suggest courts incorrectly decide only a small per-
centage of cases, whether because of judicial incompetence, corruption,
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local protectionism, or other reasons. Very few cases are supervised, and
even fewer result in a changed verdict.85 On the other hand, the relatively
high rate of reversals, remands, and mediated settlements of the cases
actually supervised might suggest that more cases should be super-
vised.86 At minimum, it means that eliminating ICS would result in tens
of thousands of parties every year being forced to live with unjust deci-
sions. Elimination of ICS on efficiency grounds therefore runs directly
up against support of ICS on justice grounds, raising perennial questions
about the value of justice.
In my view, ICS is necessary at present. There are still too many
cases in which individuals are denied justice to do away with ICS. While
some may disagree about the wisdom of retaining ICS, all will agree that
significant reforms are necessary to make the process more transparent,
fair, and efficient. As these reforms address the issues of judicial compe-
tence and corruption, the costs and benefits of ICS will change, as will
the balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability,
equity and efficiency, and substantive justice and procedural justice.
Thus, the desirability of ICS and its operation will need to be revisited in
light of changing circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
What, then, does this selective survey of legal reforms tell us? First,
our descriptive metaphors are of limited utility. In some cases it is possi-
ble to describe a particular institution, rule, or practice as a foreign
transplant or the result of a top-down/deductive or bottom-up/inductive
process. In most cases, however, these metaphors fail to capture the
complexity of the situation. Indeed, most reforms will involve a mixture
of foreign and domestic inputs that interact in complicated ways, as well
85. Each year, the courts handle approximately 6 million cases, of which less than 2%
end up being retried. 1998 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN 137 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA]
[hereinafter LAW Y.B.]; 1999 LAW Y.B. 121; 2000 LAW Y.B. 131; 2001 LAW Y.B. 165; 2002
LAw Y.B. 157; 2003 LAw Y.B. 150. Only a minuscule fraction-between 0.3 % and 0.4% of all
cases handled by the courts-result in a changed verdict. 1998 LAW Y.B. 1241; 1999 LAW Y.B.
1023; 2000 LAw Y.B. 1211; 2001 LAw Y.B. 1258; 2002 LAw Y.B. 1240; 2003 LAw Y.B. 1322.
86. The ratio of cases reversed to those supervised is, in the aggregate, rather high,
although it varies by type of supervision, type of case, and from place to place. For example,
in 2001, the courts completed 21,098 cases in which the procuracy protested. Of those, the
court reversed its decision in 4697 cases, the court upheld the decision in 7440 cases, the pro-
curacy withdrew the protest in 1055 cases, the court remanded the case in 1538 cases because
of new evidence or the facts were unclear, and the parties successfully mediated or reached
agreement in 6368 cases. SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 2002 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONG-
ZUO BAOGAO [Supreme People's Court 2002 Work Report], at http://www.court.gov.cn/
work/200302120016.htm.
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as attempts to deduce successful approaches from both general princi-
ples and local circumstances and induce possible solutions from
experiments, pilot studies, and experiences both in China and abroad.
8 7
Metaphors such as selective adaptation or "X with Chinese characteris-
tics" are better suited to capturing the complexity of reforms, but they
fail to provide much guidance regarding the degree of change involved
or the factors explaining the outcome of reforms.
Second, efforts to explain or predict which reforms will be success-
ful are just beginning. Political ideology, level of economic development,
position in the global economy, institutional capacity, cultural differ-
ences, colonial history, and interest group politics are all key factors. The
relevance of the factors will vary in different regions, different states
within the region, different types of legal systems, and different areas of
law within a given legal system, and will be more or less significant at
different stages in the reform process.
Scholars must complement studies relying on abstract variables like
rule of law with specific studies that break these variables down into
more discrete institutions and practices. Separate studies should focus
on each of the major actors: the judiciary, prosecutors, police and correc-
tional officers, and other legal professions. These studies should also
take into account the development of other roles and institutions that per-
form law-related services. Similarly, scholars should pay more attention
to the different pace and trajectory of development in various areas of
law and explore the mechanisms by which reforms in one area may have
spillover effects in other areas.
Additional multistate empirical studies will likely shed further light
on some of the main factors that determine success or failure in legal
reforms.89 Such studies, however, cannot explain all of the institutional
87. This is not surprising, at least for reforms introduced via laws, as the NPC lawmak-
ing process typically involves both domestic and foreign input. Drafters will usually collect
relevant laws from many different states for reference. A drafting committee will then tour
China to get a sense of the problems people working in the system are facing and their pro-
posed solutions. A drafting group, often headed by a legal scholar or at least involving
academics, will then prepare a draft for discussion. The draft will then be circulated to relevant
departments and interested parties, including, in some cases, foreign businesses or their repre-
sentatives such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Drafts of important laws such as the
Marriage Law are also made available for public comment. See generally Michael W. Dowdle,
The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People's Congress, 11 J.
ASIAN L. 1 (1997).
88. For a variety of criticisms of current measures of rule of law, including the argu-
ment that many of the measures are too abstract to provide specific guidance to policymakers,
see Kevin Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 141 (2004)
89. CHRISTINA BIEBESHEIMER & J. MARK PAYNE, IDB EXPERIENCE IN JUSTICE RE-
FORM: LESSONS LEARNED AND ELEMENTS OF POLICY FORMULATION 10 (2001), available at
http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/sgc-IDBExperiences-E.pdf (noting problems with available
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variation or the results in particular states. The outcomes of specific re-
forms such as individual case supervision or administrative detention
will likely be the product of a complex interplay of factors, including a
highly contested domestic political process.
Thus, broad empirical studies must be complemented by in-depth
case studies that shed light on the local political process and other local
factors. In-depth studies may capture factors, such as a change in leader-
ship, that might explain particular reforms-as in the case of the
elimination of DR, which stemmed in part from the desire of the new
Hu-Wen government to gain public support and differentiate itself from
the Jiang regime.
Many commentators have observed that efforts to export rule of law
have been unsuccessful. 90 Some attribute this largely to cultural differ-
ences, 91 while others point to political factors, such as lack of political
participation and local ownership in determining the reform agenda,92 or
economic93 or institutional factors. Yet reforms have succeeded in many
cases, especially in East Asia, where the legal systems of Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore are all ranked among the best in the world.
In China's case, reforms have been relatively successful, although
there remains much to be improved. While most commentators portray
political ideology as the main obstacle to establishing rule of law in
China, the biggest obstacles at present are systemic in nature and involve
the lack of institutional capacity. In the future, economic factors, the in-
terests of key institutional and social actors, and ultimately political
quantitative data, including that measuring instruments are too general to be of much use);
Veronica Taylor, The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transi-
tion Economies, in LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey
ed., forthcoming 2006) (discussing and evaluating four popular measures for evaluating legal
systems and legal reforms); Carothers, supra note 2 (noting that the lack of systematic empiri-
cal studies has hindered development of our knowledge base but also suggesting that the
complexity of the task of promoting rule of law and particularities of legal systems under-
mines efforts to develop better theories).
90. See Carothers, supra note 2; see also Brooks, supra note 2; see also Lindsey, supra
note 2; see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2.
91. Brooks, supra note 2; PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECON-
STRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); Licht et al., supra note 49; Lawrence M. Friedman,
On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1969) (emphasizing the need for legal devel-
opment reform programs to pay more attention to legal culture); LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION-LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE (Lawrence M. Friedman &
Rogelio Perez-Perdomo eds., 2003); cf. Robert Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-
Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development, in ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996, 191-218 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of law complying with efficient social norms), available at http://works.bepress.coml
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1090&context=robertcooter.
92. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 22 (emphasizing political-economy based
obstacles over resource or cultural factors in Latin America and Russia).
93. ZAKARIA, supra note 26.
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ideology (if China remains a single-party socialist state) are likely to
exert the most influence on legal reforms and their likelihood of success.
This suggests that when political will for change is present, reforms
aimed at improving institutional capacity will likely prove beneficial.
Reforms, however, must be sequenced to avoid overtaxing the existing
institutions.
China's relative success in carrying out legal change to date is partly
attributable to strong domestic support for the reforms-reforms which
in many cases have deviated from the international community's models.
Although the reform process in China falls far short of the deliberative
democracy ideal (or even the highly compromised version that exists
even in advanced Western liberal democracies), it generally involves a
lengthy deliberative process that brings together legislators, academic
experts, representatives from key sectors affected by the changes, and
foreign consultants. With the passage of the Law on Legislation and ex-
periments in administrative rulemaking, the public has a greater
opportunity to participate in lawmaking and rulemaking processes
through public hearings and other avenues for comment. Nevertheless,
the reform process has been primarily a technocratic one driven by ex-
perts and elites inside and outside the government.
China and other East Asian states such as Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan have implemented reforms, including institution-building
measures and investment in education and human resources, that have
benefited the broad populace.9' In contrast, Latin American and African
reform efforts have suffered from patronage systems in which govern-
ment leaders divert state assets into the hands of a few and elites block
reform efforts aimed at benefiting the majority of citizens. The problems
have continued even after democratization. The public good nature of
legal reforms is a barrier to reforms in democracies, in that even though
reforms would be welfare-enhancing overall, the benefits may be widely
dispersed, leading to collective action problems. 9 Individual beneficiar-
ies of reforms may not have the incentive to become politically active,
while those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo inside or
outside the government will be motivated to block reforms or undermine
them at the implementation stage.
In China, the government has been able to push through welfare-
enhancing legal reforms despite opposition from certain sectors. To be
94. The correlation between wealth and civil and political rights, economic rights, rule
of law and other good governance indicators is lower in Latin America and Africa than in East
Asia, indicating that government leaders in Latin America and Africa are not utilizing eco-
nomic resources for the benefit of the broad public to the same extent as in East Asia. See
Peerenboom, supra note 32.
95. Cf Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 22.
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sure, even in China, the policy-making process is contested and com-
promises are frequently required to pass reforms. Nevertheless, the Party
generally retains the authority to resolve disputes between different state
organs when necessary.
When there is considerable political opposition to reforms among
key actors, the options are more limited. Reformers may try to persuade
opponents as to the merits of reforms or cajole them into accepting
changes that may be at odds with their immediate or long-term interests.
Alternatively, they may try to circumvent the opposition by building
broad-based support. When the opposition stems from elites seeking to
protect their entrenched interests, reformers may turn toward bottom-up
approaches. In many cases, however, such efforts will not be sufficient.
Reformers may need to co-opt or buy out opponents, sometimes by
packaging controversial measures with other reforms attractive to the
opposition.
Compromises-the nitty-gritty of everyday politics-are often nec-
essary. But a compromise acceptable to all parties may not always be
possible. In such cases, reformers may have to relegate their major pro-
posals to the "too hard" basket, to address later when conditions change.
In the meantime, they should focus on smaller, more technical changes.
Although reformers should not waste resources on projects that cannot
be implemented,96 they should resist the temptation to walk away when
the political will for fundamental change is absent.
This survey of legal reforms also demonstrates many of the difficul-
ties in appraising legal reforms. In particular, assessment or evaluation
raises issues about the proper timeframe and standard. Too often, foreign
commentators jump to negative conclusions about legal reforms in China
and elsewhere because they have not produced miraculous changes
overnight. There is a danger of repeating the mistakes of the earlier law
and development movement, when some of the movement's leaders
abandoned ship at the first sight of troubled waters. As other commenta-
tors pointed out, however, people living in developing states had no
choice but to push on with reforms. As a result, many states made pro-
gress in improving their legal systems, and reformers learned valuable
lessons from both their successes and failures.97
96. Jeffrey A. Clark et al., The Collapse of the World Bank's Judicial Reform Project in
Peru, in LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed., forth-
coming 2006) (criticizing the World Bank for pressing on with a project aimed at judicial
independence despite numerous warning signs that the Fujimori regime was opposed to mean-
ingful judicial independence).
97. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 470, 474 (1995) (book review) (noting that practitioners in many developing states had no
choice but to carry on with reforms even when U.S. academics lost faith in the earlier law and
development movement). For a number of reports summarizing lessons learned from recent
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In some cases, things may have to get worse before they can get bet-
ter. Some of the changes to the Chinese legal system in recent years have
placed China's criminal and civil law halfway between a civil system
and a common law system. For instance, the transition to an adversarial
system in the 1990s made lawyers largely responsible for presenting
their client's case in civil litigation. Yet the reforms did not include
changes to the rules regarding discovery, thus forcing lawyers to go to
court with inadequate information to effectively argue their cases. Once
the problems became apparent, the SPC issued rules to strengthen dis-
covery rights.
Moreover, many reforms serve as second-best solutions to short-term
problems of weak institutions, corruption, and insufficient judicial train-
ing. Once these problems are addressed, there will be less need for an
adjudicative committee to review cases or for individual supervision by
the legislature or procuracy. More fundamentally, the judiciary will be
able to assume greater independence once judges are more competent
and judicial corruption is less prevalent. While judicial independence is
high on the list of the international community and many domestic re-
formers, providing greater independence to incompetent or corrupt
judges makes little sense.98 The need to pace reforms will require accept-
ing second-best solutions that significant political factions will inevitably
criticize.
Legal reforms may be evaluated according to a range of very differ-
ent standards, producing very different conclusions about their success.
The high correlation between GDP and rule of law suggests that judging
a state according to the relevant standard of the average states in its in-
come class will often produce more useful results than comparing it
against the standards of legal systems in wealthy states, which inevitably
leads to the preordained and all too often condescending conclusion that
legal systems in developing states are deficient or primitive. The patron-
izing conclusion that these legal systems are backward then leads to
well-intentioned efforts to export models not appropriate for the context,
or less well-intentioned neoimperialistic attempts to impose one's own
contested normative values on others and force them to adopt institutions
that serve one's own economic and political interests.
Many current reform projects aim to increase the efficiency of the
Chinese legal system. While efficiency is important, assessing legal re-
forms in terms of efficiency standards alone is insufficient. Whatever the
efforts at legal reform, see The World Bank, Reform Strategies: What Works What Hasn't,
available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/reform.htm.
98. For a proposal to increase the independence and authority of judges in stages, by
level of court and by issue, see CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 15.
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utility of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks standards for assessing economic re-
forms, legal reforms help some individuals and hurt others; even when
there is a potential for the losers to be compensated, they often are not.
Assessment of legal reforms will involve controversial normative is-
sues about the proper distribution of resources and the proper balance
between efficiency and justice, social stability and individual rights, and
substantive justice and procedural justice. The majority of citizens in
different societies may come to different conclusions on such issues. As
is true elsewhere, conflicting ethical views and competing conceptions of
justice and rule of law within China ensure continued disagreement
about the normative merits of specific reforms.
The task of balancing the costs and benefits of reforms is usually
best left to the domestic political process. Of course, limits on political
participation and other shortcomings may cause the process to fall far
short of the type of idealistic deliberative democracy envisioned by some
theorists. Yet there are benefits to allowing states to make their own deci-
sions, learn from their mistakes, and make adjustments accordingly. The
resulting rules are likely to enjoy greater legitimacy, and the process it-
self is likely to contribute to democratic learning and the maturation of
political institutions and civil society.
Finally, what this survey demonstrates most of all is the need for
pragmatism regarding legal reforms. We should avoid the Arthurian
quest for the holy grail: a single, comprehensive, unified theory able to
predict both macro and micro legal system reforms in all states. There
may be more than one model of development. A model of development
that works in one region may not work in another.
Attempts to impose too specific a model will likely fail, as repeated
attempts to force a liberal democratic model of rule of law on other
states have shown. Similarly, an attempt to transplant institutions or
practices that may work in wealthy states to poor states is likely to fail.
Successful reforms require greater appreciation of differences in local
circumstances, including levels of wealth, popular attitudes, and existing
political institutions and cultures. A pragmatic reformer should be wary
of one-size-fits-all solutions and instead choose between foreign or
homegrown models and inductive or deductive approaches on a case-by-
case basis.
Critics complain that general lessons about law and development are
superficial and abstract.99 Yet in many cases, reports by practitioners in-
clude a plethora of more specific proposals and suggestions derived from
in-depth case studies. The problem with these context-specific sugges-
99. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 2.
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tions is that they shift the focus away from generalist foreign advisors
toward those with greater local knowledge.
Although many international participants in the new law and devel-
opment movement claim to have learned the lesson that there is no single
blueprint, they often react negatively to any attempt by local govern-
ments to deviate from model laws or to experiment with innovative
institutional arrangements. The international community has been ex-
tremely hostile to several regulatory innovations in China, including
administrative detention, adjudicative supervision committees, and indi-
vidual case supervision. Knee-jerk proposals to simply eliminate these
institutions typically fail to consider the negative consequences that
would likely result from their elimination. A human rights commissioner
from a European state once acknowledged in conversation that eliminat-
ing administrative detention would most likely make things worse for
most of those now subject to such detention, but he then noted that it
would be politically impossible for him given his position and constitu-
ency to support a more nuanced approach to China that would allow for
the continuation of some form of this system. Doing so would undermine
the apparent universality of the right of habeas corpus and the ultimately
illusory consensus on the right to be free from "arbitrary detention."
A pragmatic approach will require that states be afforded a wider
margin of appreciation on contested rights issues and be given greater
leeway to deviate from neoliberal economic policies in order to reduce
social tensions. Adhering strictly to the IMF's structural adjustment poli-
cies and other neoliberal economic dogma has exacerbated ethnic
tensions and fueled popular uprisings, often leading to government re-
pression.' °° The repression of political dissent has in turn undermined the
legitimacy of newly established democratic governments. Some govern-
ments have reverted to autocracy, while others have become one of the
many nonliberal democracies that now constitute almost half of all the
democracies in the world.
The conflict between general neoliberal prescriptions and social sta-
bility issues arose in the context of China's draft Bankruptcy Law.
Worried about the social unrest that could result from massive lay-offs of
employees, the drafters of the law struggled over treatment of state-
owned enterprises and whether they should set aside funds for retraining
100. Linda Camp Keith & Steven Poe, The U.S., the I.M.E, and Human Rights, in THE
UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD (David P. Forsythe
ed., 2000) (weak short term increase in level of repression following receipt IMF loan); M.
Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli, Money Talks? The Impact of World Bank Struc-
tural Adjustment Lending on Government Respect for Human Rights 1981-2000, Presented at
the American Political Science Association 2003 Annual Meeting (August 2003) (finding
there was a significant increase in the probability of torture, extra-judicial killing, and political
disappearances in the three years following a Structural Adjustment Agreement).
Spring 20061
Michigan Journal of International Law
and resettlement of workers before using them to offset the claims of
secured creditors. The political compromise was to carve out an excep-
tion for certain, presumably large, state-owned enterprises, with the
exception to be phased out over time. In addition, the draft law requires
payment of employee salaries, social insurance fees, and other compen-
sation as provided by laws and regulations, which arguably includes
retraining and resettlement costs, prior to payment to secured creditors.
Foreign commentators and representatives from international financial
institutions (IFIs), as expected, dutifully expressed concerns about these
deviations from international norms and best practices, all the while re-
peating the mantra that there is no single approach or universal solution
to bankruptcy issues. Some even acknowledged, when commenting in
their personal capacity rather than as a representative of IFIs or their for-
eign investor clients, that these compromises did seem to be reasonable
adjustments to local circumstances. In any event, given the complexity of
the issues and the less than stellar results from relying on foreign experts
in other states, China should be allowed to experiment on what are es-
sentially domestic political issues, albeit with international economic
components, and make its own mistakes.'0 ' One can hardly imagine the
leaders from the G-7 states deferentially acceding to advice from IFIs on
such contested domestic political issues as bankruptcy reforms, tax rules,
or social welfare polices, although the political uproar that would surely
ensue is easy to imagine.
China has, for the most part, been able to resist international pres-
sure to conform to a particular legal paradigm, partly because of its size
and geopolitical importance '02 and partly because its leadership remains
fundamentally pragmatic. While commentators often cite the scientific
background of Chinese state leaders as a negative, such a background
fosters a pragmatic, problem-solving outlook that depends more on con-
sequences than ideology, the latest theory of development, or the latest
101. See William A.W. Nielson, Competition Laws for Asian Transitional Economies:
Adaptation to Local Legal Cultures in Vietnam and Indonesia, in LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOP-
ING AND TRADITIONAL STATES, (Tim Lindsey ed., forthcoming 2006) (noting that bankruptcy
laws pushed by the international community in Indonesia have not been implemented due to
limited state and public sector capacity, opposition by local stakeholders, and a ideological
concerns about the negative consequences of neoliberal economic policies, many of which
were forced upon Indonesia as conditions for economic aid during the Asian financial crisis);
Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Devel-
oping and Transition Countries, in LAW REFORMS IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES
(Tim Lindsey ed., forthcoming 2006) (noting that the remarkable consensus of the interna-
tional community on tax reforms ignores local politics, emphasizes efficiency over equity and
the distributional effects of tax rules, and has failed to produce the expected results in many
states).
102. Unlike many small states, China is generally able to avoid most of the conditions
imposed by the Asian Development Bank or IMF on smaller, developing states that need fi-
nancial assistance. Vietnam, which often follows China's lead, has also adopted an
incremental, pragmatic approach to reforms.
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version of the Washington Consensus.1°3 Much as China's leaders re-
sisted the advice of international experts to go for "big bang" economic
reforms in favor of a more gradual approach, so have they resisted ef-
forts to blindly ape a liberal democratic rule of law. And just as the
slower approach to economic reforms resulted in impressive economic
growth without many of the severe negative consequences of the big
bang strategy, so has the contextualized approach to legal reforms re-
sulted in steady progress.
To be sure, critics would argue that the slow pace of reforms has de-
layed the day of reckoning and increased the ultimate costs of more
fundamental reforms. Which side will have the better of the argument
remains to be seen and hinges on the ability of Chinese reformers to con-
tinue to improve the legal system and ultimately address the political
obstacles blocking the full realization of rule of law. There is a real dan-
ger government leaders will move too slowly on political reforms and
fail to implement in a timely way deep institutional reforms of the legal
system, including greater independence and authority for the judiciary.
Pragmatism has always entailed the application of creativity and in-
telligence to contemporary problems in order to devise novel and
ameliorative solutions-which themselves will lead to further problems
and the continuing need to experiment with an open mind. Open-minded
reformers cannot afford to look only West or only East, only up or only
down, only to culture, politics, or economics. A more context-sensitive
approach is necessary. Fortunately, no one seriously engaged in legal
reforms in China seems to think there is any other alternative.
103. An experimental approach is consistent with a deep streak of pragmatism running
through Chinese political philosophy and culture. See DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMES,
DEMOCRACY OF THE DEAD: DEWEY, CONFUCIUS AND THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHINA
(1999); see also DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS (1987).
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